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A numberof countries, including the U.K., NewZealand, the Netherlands, and the
U.S., have attempted to reform their health care systems using "internal market"
or "managed competition" reform models. These models signal a departure from
reliance on passive indemnity payers or insurers and require proactive purchas-
ers to intervene actively and manage allocation decisions made by physicians.
The author explores how these models will ensure the accountability of these new
decision-makers to the citizens and patients they ultimately represent. Neither
model is found to address accountability issues sufficiently. However, the
managed competition model offers the promise of tailoring market (exit), political
(voice) and regulatory mechanisms to create the optimal mix of incentives. It is
argued that every type of health system (including Canada's) has long overlooked
accountability and governance mechanisms. Decision-makers must have incen-
tives to make decisions which strike the right balance between patients' needs
and societal interest, and more generally between equity and efficiency. Solving
this key problem demands the attention of policymakers, lawyers, and
economists.
Plusieurs pays, dont le Royaume-Uni, la Nouvelle-Zelande, les Pays-Bas et les
Etats-Unis, ont essaye de rWformer leurs systemes de sant6 sur le modele du
,march6 domestique" ou de la -concurrence dirig6e,. Ces modules marquent
un ecart du systeme qui d~pendait des paiements des indemnites par des
payeurs passifs ou par des assureurs et ils requierent l'intervention active des
acheteurs et leur implication au niveau de la gestion des d6cisions d'affectations
prises par les m6decins. L'auteur explore comment ces modeles assureront la
responsabilite financiere des nouveaux d6cideurs vis-6-vis les citoyens et les
patients qu'ils repr~sentent en fin de compte. Aucun de ces modules traite
suffisammentla question de la responsabilite financiere des d~cideurs. Cependant,
le module de concurrence dirig6e offre la perspective d'un march6 personnalis6,
d'une voix politique et de mecanismes reglementaires pour presenter le m6lange
d'incitations le plus efficace. II a 6t6 avancd que chaque module de systeme de
sante (incluant celui du Canada) a Iongtemps ignor6 les m6canismes concernant
la responsabilit6 financiere et la gerance. Les decideurs doivent avoir des
incitations pour prendre des d6cisions qui crient le bon 6quilibre entre les
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besoins des patients et les int6r~ts sociaux etplus generalement entre I'6quit6 et
I'efficacit. R6soudre ce problome majeur requiert I'attention des politiciens, des
avocats et des 6conomistes.
Introduction
Over the course of the last decade, nearly every major OECD country has
either proposed or implemented health care reform.' There have been a
number of factors which alone or in combination have precipitated
reform initiatives, including increased total spending on health, increases
in government expenditures, access concerns, and growing rationing
through waiting times. Reform has also been driven by the work of
healtheconomists, who have emphasized that there is no evidence that
many health care services supplied by physicians are cost-effective or
even effective.' This problem is seen to stem from leaving allocation
decisions in the hands of physicians who have been resistant to outside
scrutiny of their decision-making processes, and who have had little or no
incentive to be sensitive to the costs and benefits of the services they
supply or recommend. Allocation decisions have been left to physicians
as both public and private insurers have acted, historically, as passive
"indemnity insurers," reimbursing providers for the costs of all services
supplied on a fee-for-service basis. Thus the concern has arisen that the
present allocation of resources, both across health needs and between
health services used in response to those needs, has been defined by the
medical profession. It is argued this has resulted in more expenditures on
acute care and expensive technology than is optimal from society's
perspective.
In a number of countries, such as the U.K., New Zealand, the Nether-
lands, and the U.S., there have been recent shifts towards the use of
market-like forces in an attempt to improve the efficiency of their
respective health care systems.3 The reform models, "managed compe-
tition," "managed care" and "internal markets" (explained below) signal
1. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Reform of Health Care
Systems: A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries, (Paris: OECD, 1994) (hereinafter OECD
1994 Review of Seventeen Countries).
2. For example,R. G. Evans,"Going for the Gold: The Redistributive Agenda Behind Market-
Based Health Care Reform" (1997) 22 J. of Health Pol. Policy & Law 427 at 460 notes that
students of health care system believe that there is a great deal of "inappropriate, unnecessary,
and sometimes downright harmful care being paid for in all modem health care systems." He
goes on to note that the key question becomes one of moving closer to production frontiers.
3. Other countries experimenting with market-oriented reform include Finland, Sweden,
countries comprising the former U.S.S.R., Germany and Israel.
472 Dalhousie Law Journal
a departure from reliance on passive indemnity insurers and require
proactive purchasers (be they government-appointed authorities or pri-
vate insurers) to intervene actively in physicians' allocation decisions.
The objective is to create greater pressure on the demand or purchasing
side than has been the case historically, so as to realize a more appropriate
balance between societal and patient needs in the allocation of resources
and to ensure the supply of the most cost-effective service in response to
a particular need. Despite greater reliance on market-like forces, the
ultimate goal of managed competition and internal market reform models
is still a redistributive one, namely to ensure access by all citizens to a
comprehensive range of health services with allocation occurring on the
basis of need rather than ability to pay. Thus market tools are harnessed
as a means to achieve a social justice end. This latter approach is clearly
distinguishable and should not be confused with the present U.S. - style
system where, despite government programs for the poor and the aged,
a significant proportion of health care resources is distributed on the basis
of ability to pay.
By comparison, Canada's approach to reform still reflects that taken
by most OECD countries throughout the 1980s, namely to achieve cost
containment by reducing the number of inputs into the system. Thus
reform is primarily directed towards reducing the numbers and distribu-
tion of physicians and other health providers, the numbers of hospitals
and hospital beds, and the amount and distribution of technology.4
Canada's policies are based upon the assumption that the more hospitals,
health providers, and technology in a system of full insurance, the greater
the increase in cost irrespective of need or outcome.5 This approach, as
an OECD report notes, acknowledges the "limited effectiveness of
market forces ... and eschews policies such as managed competition and
the creation of internal markets."6 However, this cost containment
4. As recent examples of this sort of reform see the Health Services Restructuring Commission's
Ottawa Health Services Restructuring Report (February 1997) and Metropolitan Toronto
Health Services Restructuring Report (March 1997). In the latter report, the Commission
recommends the outright closure of nine hospital sites in Metropolitan Toronto, which is
estimated to result in a reduction of acute care beds from 6,173 (as at March 31,1996) to 4,414.
5. It is believed that in the absence of supply side controls, the combination of full insurance
and information asymmetry between health providers and patients will result in increasing
health expenditures with diminishing marginal returns in terms of health outcomes. In other
words, health providers can and sometimes will influence demand for their own services and
may recommend to patients they receive health services that are not cost-effective and patients
have neither the financial incentive nor the knowledge to prevent this. This hypothesis is not
without controversy; see R. Labelle, G. Stoddart & T. Rice, "A Re-examination of the Meaning
and Importance of Supplier-Induced Demand" (1994) 13 J. of Health Econ. 347.
6. OECD 1994 Review of Seventeen Countries, supra note I at 103.
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approach is a relatively crude regulatory tool and provides no incentives
to rethink and improve the range, mix, and quality of health services
supplied. Rather than improving the efficiency with which services are
delivered, health providers may simply shift costs. This outcome may
take a variety of forms in Canada's health system, including shifting
costs to the pharmaceutical sector which is not subject to government
cost control (as 66 percent of it is financed by private funding),7 longer
waiting times for publicly funded services,' or requiring unpaid family
members to provide home-care services.9
The experience of the U.K. and New Zealand (both of which spend
significantly less on health as a percentage of GDP than Canada)
suggests that simply restricting the flow of resources into the system and
leaving allocation decisions to health providers operating under hard
budgets will result in growing waiting lists and times, growing dissatis-
faction with the health system, and cost-shifting. 10 Moreover, a lack of
sensitivity on the part of physicians to the costs and benefits of health
services supplied or recommended seems to be a general problem in all
systems, even those which have tightly controlled the resources avail-
able to the system. In other words, simply tightening budgets may not
result in better allocation decisions but more adroitness in cost-shifting
to other payers, to patients, or to society at large. Capping health care
expenditures can only be a short-term answer. In the longer term, a
system must focus (at the macro level) on the decision-making processes
whereby health needs are prioritized so as to balance societal interest
with patients' needs. At the micro level, the system must be organized
to ensure the selection of the most cost-effective service to satisfy a
particular need and to ensure the delivery of quality health services at
least cost.
Increasingly, there are calls in Canada to introduce "managed care"
in order to make health providers sensitive to and accountable for the
7. The National Forum noted that expenditures per person on drugs, adjusted for inflation,
more than doubled between 1975 and 1994 from $108 to $232 per person and that drug
expenditures increased faster than any other major category of health care; "Directions for a
Pharmaceutical Policy in Canada" in National Forum on Health, Canada Health Action:
Building on the Legacy, Vol. II, Synthesis Reports and Issues Papers (Ottawa: National Forum
on Health, 1997) at 3.
8. For figures on growing waiting lists in Canada see C. Ramsay and M. Walker, Waiting Your
Turn: Hospital Waiting Lists In Canada, 6th ed. (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1996).
9. See for example, J. E. Fast et al., Conceptualizing and Operationalizing the Costs of
Informal Elder Care, Final Technical Report to the National Health Research Development
Program (NHRDP) March 17, 1997 at 4-11.
10. So, for example, resulting in growth in expenditures in areas that are more heavily
privately financed such as drug coverage.
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costs of the health services they provide or recommend." As I will
demonstrate, although Canada has to date eschewed what are viewed as
more "market" reforms such as internal market and managed competition
reform, there is in fact a convergence occurring between these types of
reform and managed care reform. Similar problems arise in all three types
of reform and Canadian policymakers can clearly benefit from analyzing
critically the experiences of other countries to date.
In this paper I analyze and compare internal market and managed
competition reform models as implemented or proposed in the U.K., New
Zealand, the Netherlands, and the U.S. A variety of important issues arise
from such a cross-comparison. This paper focuses particularly on the
accountability of purchasers (be they government-appointed authorities
or competing private insurers) to the citizens they ultimately represent.
Accountability and governance issues in general have long been over-
looked in health systems, yet such issues are vital from the perspective of
ensuring and improving the performance of decision-makers.
Improving accountability should improve the quality of decision-
making by reducing agency costs between decision-makers and the
citizens they represent. Donahue argues that concerns with efficiency are,
at their base, merely part of a concern for the more fundamental issue of
accountability. 2 What is the scope of "accountability"? In the health
sector it is possible to identify at least three spheres of accountability:
political, market, and professional. 3 This paper is primarily concerned
with ensuring accountability through political and market mechanisms
although brief reference is made to professional accountability. First, I
argue that a series of difficult agency questions and public choice
problems arises with respect to the accountability of government-ap-
pointed purchasers in the U.K. and New Zealand, where there are
insufficient incentives to ensure that purchasers are responsive to the
citizens they represent. Next, I evaluate the prospects for the use of
political "voice" by citizens as a means of reducing agency costs between
citizens and the government-appointed purchasers that represent them.
Finally, I canvass the advantages and disadvantages of some of the
possible means of enhancing voice, and the limits of voice as an
accountability and efficiency-enhancing mechanism.
11. See for example, the Nova Scotia government's proposal to pay doctors on a capitation
basis: Good Medicine: Securing Doctors' Services for Nova Scotians (Halifax: Nova Scotia
Department of Health, 1997).
12. J. D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (New York:
Basic Books, 1989) at 10.
13. E. J. & L. L. Emanuel, "What Is Accountability In Health Care?" (1996) 124 Ann. Intern.
Med. 229.
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In addition to political voice, I examine "exit," a market mechanism,
as a means of improving accountability. In managed competition propos-
als in the Netherlands and the U.S., consumer choice of insurers in a
regulated market is viewed as the means through which to ensure
accountability and efficiency. Citizens must choose an insurer or pur-
chaser offering a managed care plan that best suits their needs and, if
dissatisfied, may "exit" to another insurer or purchaser with a risk-
adjusted share of public funding. I will discuss the relative costs and
benefits of exit as a means of reducing agency costs and ensuring
accountability.
Although managed competition and internal market models are prima
facie different, there is arguably a convergence as internal market
systems move towards managed care arrangements. Government-ap-
pointed purchasers and private insurers in all systems may wish to shift
financial risk to groups of health providers offering managed care plans.
They shift risk by paying groups of providers on a capitated basis. 4 In
such a case, the group of providers takes on the insurance function as it
bears the costs and risk of utilization of services by patients, the purchaser
function as it largely determines what range and mix of health services to
supply to any individual it covers, and (at its discretion) the provider
function if it actually owns the hospitals or employs the providers who
provide services to patients. Consequently, the roles of the public and
private sectors and of insurers, purchasers, and providers in all systems
are shifting and becoming less compartmentalized.
5
I. The Reform Models
The language of health care reform is often confusing and there seems to
be a small cottage industry inventing phrases and acronyms for the
emerging new arrangements between insurers, purchasers, providers and
patients. For political reasons, dissimilar reform initiatives may be
labelled by the same name. 6 Thus it is important to clarify at the outset
what I mean by the terms "internal market reform", "managed competi-
tion reform" and "managed care".
14. A lump sum per person to cover all health services for that person over a given period
regardless how many services were actually rendered to that person.
15. W. P.M. M. van de Ven, F. T. Schut, & F. F. H. Rutten, "Forming and Reforming the
Market for Third-Party Purchasing of Health Care" (1994) 39 Soc. Sci. Med. 1405.
16. For example, Marmor quotes one speaker at a January 1993 retreat for congressional staff
members in the U.S. where they pondered the prospects for health reform as saying, "I don't
know what we're going to do, but whatever it is, we'll call it managed competition." T. R.
Marmor, Understanding Health Care Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) at 12.
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1. Internal Market Reform and the Purchaser/Provider Split
Recent reforms in both the U.K. and New Zealand have sought to create
what is known as an "internal market" in health services, and the reforms
implemented in both countries are very similar. Proposals for reform of
the U.K.'s National Health Service ("the NHS"), first announced in 1989,
were implemented through the National Health Service and Communi'ty
Care Act 1990.17 In New Zealand, the then Minister of Health released his
proposals for internal market reform in 1991," 8 many of which were
implemented pursuant to the Health and Disability Services Act 1993.19
In both reformed systems, the purchaser and provider roles of regional
public authorities, formerly responsible for purchasing secondary and
community services and for managing public hospitals, have been split.
The goal of the reforms is to eliminate what was seen as a conflict of
interest in the old health authorities in both countries. Prior to reform,
health authorities were both purchasers (as they bought all publicly
funded hospital and secondary services) and providers (as they managed
the government-owned hospitals that supplied most of the services). The
perception was that the old public hospitals were not performing as
efficiently as they could as they were under little pressure to do so. In the
new internal market, government-appointed monopsony purchasers (100
Health Authorities in the U.K. and 4 Regional Health Authorities in New
Zealand) must now bargain with competing public and private health
service providers and contract for the supply of a full range of publicly-
funded health services for the people of their regions. They are not
permitted to provide health services directly. On the other side of the
"split," public hospitals are now managed in the U.K. and New Zealand
by, respectively, "NHS Trusts" and "Crown Health Enterprises." In both
systems these new enterprises are meant to act much more like private
firms and compete with each other and private providers for supply
contracts with government purchasers. 0
An exception to the purchaser/provider split in the U.K.'s internal
market are "GP Fundholders," of which there are over 3500. Fundholders
receive public funding, in the form of capitated budgets, with which to
finance their own services and to buy drugs, diagnostic tests and x-rays,
outpatient services and elective surgical services, on behalf of the patients
17. (U.K.), c. 19 [hereinafter NHS 1990 Act].
18. S. Upton, Your Health and the Public Health - A Statement ofGovernment Health Policy
(Wellington: Minister of Health, July 1991) at 11-19.
19. (N.Z.), No. 22 [hereinafter NZ Health 1993 Act].
20. Thus the term "internal market" is something of a misnomer as the market created is not
intended to be limited to the public sector although in reality it continues largely to be so.
Accountability of Health Service Purchasers
enrolled with them. Thus the purchaser and provider roles are combined
in one enterprise. Similarly, in New Zealand "Independent Practice
Associations" ("IPAs") are exceptions to the purchaser/provider split.
IPAs are groups of physicians of varying size that receive budgets from
Regional Health Authorities to fund their own services and other
specified services such as drugs, diagnostic texts, x-rays etc. on behalf
of their patients. Fundholding and IPAs are examples of "managed care"
which is described further below.
2'
On 8 December 1997, the new Labour government in the U.K.
released a White Paper detailing further reforms in the U.K.2 2 It is
beyond the scope of this article to consider in depth the content of these
reforms. The reforms provide for the abolition of GP Fundholders and
for the creation of "Primary Care Trusts," which are to be large groups
of general practitioners and community nurses who will commission
services from NHS Trusts. The NHS Trusts will remain independent
organizations, although there is the possibility that Primary Care Trusts
will vertically integrate with NHS Trusts and share management
functions.
2. Managed Competition Reform
U.K. and New Zealand citizens have no choice but to rely upon a
government-appointed purchaser to purchase on their behalf publicly-
financed health services; they cannot exit or shift with a share of public
funding to another purchaser. This is in contrast to managed competition
reform. Managed competition requires private insurers to compete for
the allegiance of customers who bring with them a risk-adjusted share
of public funding, within a government-regulated system. Alain Enthoven
is often considered to be the creator of the managed competition
model.23 In the Netherlands, what became known as the Dekker Com-
21. A key distinction between Fundholding and IPAs is that Fundholding is a central
government initiative whereas IPAs have sprung up as a response by physicians to the new
internal market reforms; see L. Malcolm & M. Powell, "The Development of Independent
Practice Associations and Related Groups in New Zealand" (1996) 109 N.Z. Med. J. 184 at 186
noting that "IPAs were viewed as vehicles for protecting the status of general practice in the
face of considerable uncertainty."
22. See also "The New NHS," A White Paper, 8 Dec. 1997, available at
http://www.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/doh/newnhs/contents.htm.
23. For a fuller description of managed competition/managed care contracting see A. C.
Enthoven, "Consumer-Choice Health Plan (First of Two Parts): Inflation and Inequity in
Health Care Today: Alternatives for Cost Control and an Analysis of Proposals for National
Health Insurance" (1978) 298 New Eng. J. Med. 650; "Consumer-Choice Health Plan (Second
of Two Parts): A National-Health-Insurance Proposal Based on Regulated Competition in the
Private Sector" (1978) 298 New Eng. J. Med. 709. More recently, see A. C. Enthoven, "The
History and Principles of Managed Competition" (1993) 12 Health Aff. 24. See, however,
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mittee (named after its chair Dr. W. Dekker), produced a report in March
1987 which proposed reform of the Dutch health care system following
the managed competition model.24 The reform plan has changed several
times since 1987 and implementation has been incremental and is still on-
going.25 There are similarities between the Dutch reforms and proposals
for reform in Russia, Israel and Germany. 26 A version of managed
competition was also unsuccessfully proposed by President Clinton in
1993 as a means of reform of the U.S. system.
2 7
Managed competition models, unlike the present U.S. system, seek to
ensure universal coverage of citizens for a basic or core range of health
services on the basis of their need as opposed to their willingness to pay.28
A managed competition system is designed to ensure that competition
occurs between insurers on the basis of price and quality rather than risk
avoidance. Insurers' primary function under this model would be pur-
chasing health services, and they would behave quite differently from
present private insurers. Thus, although I will use the term "purchasers"
for convenience, it should be remembered that in the context of managed
competition reform, they are really "insurers/purchasers" in that they are
both purchasing and risk-bearing functions.
In a managed competition system, purchasers would not receive
premiums directly. Instead, "sponsors" (who would probably be govern-
ment-appointed bodies) would receive money either direct from central
government 29 or income-adjusted premium payments from individual
citizens. In any event, a managed competition system may be financed
largely progressively with there being little or no connection between
individual contributions and entitlements to health insurance or services.
Premiums paid on an income-related basis or money received from
U. E. Reinhardt, "Lineage of Managed Competition" Spring (II) issue (1994) 13 Health Aff.
290 who traces the managed competition idea back to H. M. and A. R. Somers at a presentation
in 1971.
24. Adview Van De Commissie Structuur en Financiering Gezondheidszorg (Commission
on the Structure and Financing of Health Care), Bereidhedi tot Verandering (Willingness To
Change), ('s Gravenhage: Distributiecentrum Overheidspublikaties, 1987) [hereinafter Dekker
Report].
25. OECD Health Policy Studies No. 2, The Reform Of Health Care: A Comparative Analysis
of Seven OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1992) at 97 and Factsheet: Health Care Reform in
the Netherlands (Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, Fact Sheet V-5-E 1993)
at5.
26. W. P.M.M. van de Ven, et al., "Risk-Adjusted Capitation: Recent Experiences in the
Netherlands" (1994) 13 Health Aff. 120 at 121.
27. See White House Domestic Policy Council, The Clinton Blueprint: The President's
Health Security Plan (New York: Times Books, 1993) [hereinafter Clinton Blueprint].
28. For a critique of the present U.S. health care system, its inequities, and its seeming
inability to change see R. G. Evans, supra note 2 at 427.
29. In which case the system would be financed through general taxation.
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central government are pooled under the auspices of the sponsor. Each
individual in the system would periodically (probably annually or
biannually) choose their particular purchaser and the sponsor would
facilitate this process, making sure that purchasers compete on price and
quality dimensions. The sponsor would then pay, on behalf of that
individual, a risk-adjusted share of the pooled funding to that individual's
chosen purchaser. The amount paid should reflect the risk-profile of the
particular individual so that purchasers are fairly compensated for the
risks they cover. It is predicted that, as a consequence, purchasers would
have incentives to compete on the cost and quality of services ultimately
provided to their enrollees, and in turn would enter into various forms
of managed care relationships with health care providers. In fact,
Enthoven has said that he now refers to his model for managed
competition as "managed care - managed competition" to emphasize
that what are meant to compete are integrated delivery systems supply-
ing comprehensive care.3"
3. Managed Care
A managed care arrangement is any contractual or organizational
arrangement whereby a purchaser (who may be the government or a
private insurer or an employer or a consortium of hospitals or physi-
cians) attempts to influence the price, volume, and quality of health
services supplied.3' Managed care techniques or arrangements can
occur in any type of system, be it the Canadian or U.S. model or the
internal market or managed competition model.
Managed care reflects a shift from public or private insurers passively
reimbursing providers for every service performed or reimbursing
policy-holders for all medical expenses incurred. Managed care may
involve insurers monitoring and reviewing physicians' recommenda-
tions and/or selecting physicians and other health providers whose
practices accord with the purchaser's perceptions of how best to service
30. P. Newman, "Interview With Alain Enthoven: Is There Convergence Between Britain
And The United States In The Organization Of Health Services" (1995) 310 Br. Med J. 1652.
31. See generally D. Mechanic, "Managed Care: Rhetoric And Realities" (1994) 31 Inquiry
124 and R. J. Amould et al., "The Role of Managed Care In Competitive Policy Reforms" in
R. J. Arnould, R. F. Rich & W. D. White, eds., Competitive Approaches to Health Care Reform
(Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1993). The American Medical Association defines
managed care as "the control of access to and limitation on physician and patient utilization of
services by public or private payers or their agents through the use of prior and concurrent
review for approval of or referral to service or site of service, and financial incentives or
penalties."- as cited by J. K. Inglehart, "Health Policy Report: The American Health Care
System" (1992) 326 New Eng. J. Med. 962 at 965.
480 Dalhousie Law Journal
health needs. It may involve public or private insurers paying a fixed sum
per enrollee for a fixed time period (generally per month or per annum)
to a group of providers who agree in return to provide a stipulated range
of health care services to the defined group of enrollees.32 This method
of reimbursement is known as capitation. In managed care plans, pur-
chasers may choose to be vertically-integrated with health care providers
(i.e. the purchasers actually own the hospitals and practices) as opposed
to simply contracting with them on an arm's length basis. In managed
care, a patient's choice of providers is generally limited to the health care
providers his or her chosen purchaser has elected to contract with or is
integrated with, or a surcharge is imposed on patients who choose
providers outside of those listed.33
In the wake of the failure of President Clinton's proposals for national
health reform in the U.S., managed care has grown rapidly as private
insurers and employers seek to shift market power from health care
providers to themselves. This phenomenon is likely to have far-reaching
implications for the future of the U.S. health care system. Enthoven notes
that managed care plans (now often referred to by the new buzz-words of
"integrated financing and delivery systems") come in a variety of types."
Some own their own hospitals, some have preferred providers or close
relationships with particular hospitals, and others enter into arm's length
contracts.
In the U.S., managed care developments are ad hoc and are not part of
a coordinated or integrated health system. The U.S. does not seek to
provide a comprehensive system ensuring access to everyone to health
services on the basis of need as opposed to ability to pay.35 There is no
specific government regulation at the federal level to ensure competition
between managed care plans on the basis of price and quality.36 In fact,
as a result of competition the number of managed care plans who
community-rate (i.e. cross-subsidize premiums from low-risk to high-
32. See J. K. Inglehart, "Health Policy Report: Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care"
(1994) 331 New Eng. J. Med. 1167.
33. M.A. Rodwin, "Conflicts in Managed Care" (1995) 332 New Eng. J. Med. 604.
34. A. C. Enthoven, "On the Ideal Market Structure for Third-Party Purchasing of Health
Care" (1994) 39 Soc. Sci. Med. 1413 at 1414.
35. In 1995,40.6 million people were uninsured, more than 10.5 million of whom were under
the age of 19 K. E. Thorpe, "Incremental Approaches to Covering Uninsured Children: Design
and Policy Issue" (1997) 16 Health Aff. 64 at 65.
36. However, in 1996 the U.S. federal government did enact the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act 1996, PL 104-191 August 21, 1996, 110 Stat 1936 (HR 3103) §301 in
an effort to ameliorate some of the worse effects of risk-avoidance techniques on the part of
insurers and to improve the portability of health insurance for those who already hold health
insurance.
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risk individuals) has declined.37 Present developments in the U.S. can be
distinguished from a managed competition system, for in the latter there
would be comprehensive coverage for all citizens and it would be largely
progressively financed.
I1. Agency and Public Choice
Enhancing accountability was cited as a goal of internal market reform in
the U.K. and New Zealand.38 Although accountability is often cited as a
key goal it is often unclear what exactly is meant by accountability. To
whom and for what is a decision-maker accountable?
In the political sphere, Donahue defines accountability as existing
where "government action accords with the will of the people the
government represents -not the will of individuals who happen to work
in the government, and not what those individuals think the citizens
should want but what the people,by their own criteria,count desirable .""3
Thus, accountability may also be described as the level of responsiveness
by public institutions to their citizenry. The question that arises is the level
of agency costs existing between citizens and their elected representa-
tives. Donahue argues that the question of agency engages the root social
challenge of accountability and devices such as the law, ethics, and the
market may all be utilized with a view to ameliorating the problem."n
Agency costs arise where one person or organization (the principal)
contracts with another person or organization (the agent) for performance
of a service and the performance requires the delegation of some
decision-making authority from the principal to the agent, but the agent's
interests do not match those of the principal." Factors reducing agency
costs between shareholders and managers in publicly-traded companies
are not generally present in the public sector. 42 Consequently, agency
37. J. Gable, "Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s" (1997) 16 Health Aff. 134.
38. The White Paper outlining internal market reform of the U.K.'s health system said the two
objectives of reform were to give patients better health care and to provide greater rewards for
those working in the National Health Service ("NHS") who "successfully respond to local
needs and preferences;" Department of Health, Working for Patients, Cm855 (London:
HMSO, 1989). Similarly, in introducing his health reform proposals in 1993, New Zealand's
then Minister of Health declared that there were three reasons to support the Bill, the first being
that it would greatly improve upon the accountability of the public health system (Hansard
Reports, 20 August 1993, 10773).
39. Donahue, supra note 12 at 23.
40. Ibid. at 10.
41. M. J. Trebilcock. The Prospects for Reinventing Government (Toronto: C. D. Howe
Institute, 1994) at 8.
42. See E. Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Finn" (1980) 88 J. Poli. Econ. 288
at 291-293.
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problems are a great deal more complicated in the public sector than
within private firms, particularly because the burden of any inefficiency
is diffused over many individuals.43
Agency cost problems are closely related to public choice analysis.'
Buchanan notes that public choice is "a perspective that emerges from an
extensive application of the tools and methods of the economist to
collective or non-market decision making."45 The theory extends to the
actions of politicians, public servants, and interest groups in the public
sphere the assumption, made by neo-classical economists, that actors in
the private market are principally motivated by self-interest. McAuslan
argues that public choice theorists are, in fact, contemptuous of democ-
racy as it has developed in the twentieth century. 46 Although many
examples of behaviour supporting public choice theory can be found in
the literature, 47 examples of governments and public servants not acting
out of self-interest (or at least appearing not to) may also be found .48 This
suggests that public decision-makers cannot always be simply assumed
to be acting out of self-interest and that what decision-makers perceive as
being in their own self-interest may be a much more complicated matrix
of factors than simply financial considerations or building or maintaining
political power.
Balancing the views of both the proponents and critics of public
choice, it seems important that there should be, wherever possible, clear
financial and political incentives for politicians and public servants to act
in the larger public interest.49 This does not mean that public provision or
43. For a further discussion see C. M. Flood, "Prospects for New Zealand's Reformed Health
System" (1996) 4 Health L. J. 87 at 95.
44. For an introduction and overview of the theory see I. McLean, Public Choice: An
Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
45. J. Buchanan, Liberty, Markets and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1986) at 19.
46. P. McAuslan, "Public Law and Public Choice" (1988) 51 Mod. L. Rev. 681 at 689; and
see M. Kelman, "On Democracy-Bashing: A Sceptical Look at the Theoretical and 'Empirical'
Practice of the Public Choice Movement" (1988) 71 Va. L. R. 199 at 268; D. A. Farber,
"Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice" (1991) 65 Chi. Kent L. Rev 161; and
D. Farber & P. Frickey, Law & Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1991).
47. In the health sector, McAuslan gives the example of senior consultants in the U.K.'s
National Health Service awarding themselves publicly-funded merit awards; McAuslan, ibid.
at 689.
48. For example, the notion that politicians are only interested in expanding their own
political empires does not rest well with the phenomenon in all industrialized countries where
governments across the political spectrum have actively tried to either down-size or privatize
public organizations. Clearly, ideas (or at least ideology) have some currency here.
49. G.Brennan & J. M. Buchanan, "Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case For The 'Noble' Lie"
(1988) 74 Va. L. Rev. 179 at 187-88 argue that public choice theory becomes problematic
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regulation of markets will be an inferior alternative to an unregulated
market (it will depend on the market), nor that a sense of public spirit on
the part of public servants should not be fostered. Whether or not they will
do so naturally, politicians and public servants must pursue the greater
public good. Incentives and checks need to be built into the system to
ensure that this occurs and to integrate the interests of the general public
(the principal) with that of politicians and public servants (the agents).
Where discretion is granted, as inevitably it must be, decision-making
should be as transparent and open as possible.
How do we operationalize these general observations in a health
allocation system? On the purchasing side, what combination of incen-
tives will solve the difficult agency problem of ensuring that purchasers
balance society's interests with those of individual patients? Let us begin
by looking at the question of to whom and for what the government-
appointed purchasers in the U.K.'s and New Zealand's reformed health
systems are accountable. Several agency questions arise in thesejurisdic-
tions: the question of agency costs between citizens and the government-
appointed purchasers, between citizens and the government, and between
the government and its own appointed purchasers. A dual agency prob-
lem arises in this latter case as, ultimately, the principal in this agency
relationship is still the general public, with central government acting on
behalf of the public in regulating and monitoring the relevant purchaser's
performance.
III. The Lines Of Accountability
The important areas of responsibility in health service allocation would
seem to be as follows:
a. determining the most allocatively efficient level of resources to be
devoted to health services, which requires balancing expenditures on
health against other areas and requires recognition that, e.g., improved
housing and nutrition, and increased employment opportunities may
have as important an effect on health outcomes as the consumption of
health services;50
when it is used in the positive sense as a predictive model of behaviour in political roles. They
argue that the proper role of public choice theory should be in the normative sense of
institutional reform, meaning improvements in the rules under which political processes
operate.
50. See generally R. G. Evans, M. L. Barer, & T. R. Marmor, eds., Why Are Some People
Healthy and Others Not? The Determinants of Health of Populations (New York: Aldine De
Gruyter, 1994).
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b. satisfying equity or justice in terms of access to health services but
otherwise determining priorities for treatment of health needs on the
basis of cost-effectiveness;
c. choosing the most cost-effective services or treatments to serve
patients' needs;
d. ensuring the production of services at least cost;
e. ensuring that the quality of services provided is adequate and meets
society's expectations;
f. ensuring that providers are sensitive to patients' concerns and that
patients' circumstances, values, and attitudes to risk are factored into the
decision-making processes at the point of supply.
To an extent these accountability requirements will conflict and thus
a balance must be struck between what is in society's interests and
patients' interests, and more broadly between equity and efficiency. As
discussed below, the lines of accountability drawn in the U.K.'s and
New Zealand's reformed systems are too often blurred and there is
confusion as to who among central government, purchasers, and provid-
ers is ultimately responsible for realization of these goals. Where goals
are clearly specified there are often not matching incentives to ensure the
realization of those goals.
As the U.K. and New Zealand systems are both financed primarily
through general taxation revenues it is effectively central government's
responsibility to determine the allocatively efficient level of resources
to devote to health services; i.e., it must decide how much to spend on
health service relative to, for example, education, defence, and tax
reductions. There is no obvious reason to suppose that the government
will be able to determine what is an efficient level to spend on health
services although, of course, there is the prospect that resources will be
distributed more fairly than in an unregulated private market. Managed
competition proposals provide more promise for determining an
allocatively efficient level of resources by restructuring and regulating
the market for private health insurance and allowing competition be-
tween private insurers to determine the total level of resources to be
spent on health. However, in those countries that have proposed or
implemented managed competition, priority has been given to contain-
ing total costs rather than letting the workings of a managed market
determine the most efficient amount in total to spend on health care."
President Clinton's (now defunct) proposal for reform did not leave cost
51. For a discussion see W. P.M. M. van de Ven, "Regulated Competition In Health Care:
With Or Without A Global Budget" (1995) 39 Eur. Econ. Rev. 786.
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control to the workings of a regulated market and instead stipulated that
managed competition take place under a global budget.52 In the Nether-
lands, despite the partial implementation of managed competition, there
has been a marked reluctance to dismantle complex price and capital
regulation designed to keep a check on total health care expenditures. 3
It is unclear whether this reluctance to dismantle price and total budget
caps arises because the administrations of these respective countries do
not really believe that managed competition will work as theoretically
envisaged, or because the overriding concern is to control increases in
government expenditures even though such increases may be (possibly)
allocatively efficient.
Once the central government has determined its annual health budget,
then in the U.K. and New Zealand these funds are paid to the various
government-appointed purchasers. Upon payment, the onus is essentially
on them to purchase primary and secondary health care services to benefit
the people they represent within their allocated budget. 4 In contracting
for health services, these government-appointed purchasers are expected
to fulfill a complex matrix of responsibilities within a fixed budget. How
do we ensure that purchasers perform their functions efficiently and
exercise their discretion in the interests of the people they represent?
In the U.K., the Audit Commission is required to audit the activities of
Health Authorities." Longley notes, however, that there are no constitu-
tional mechanisms for ensuring that the deliberations of the Commission
and similar bodies are taken into account and action taken as a result.
5 6
In New Zealand, the Audit Office audits annually the Regional Health
Authorities which must comply with the requirements of the Public
Finance Act.57 These sorts of measures ensure a degree of accountability
by reducing opportunities for fraudulent use of public money, but further
incentives are required to ensure that purchasers are accountable in the
fullest sense to the people they represent.
An initial step towards improving accountability is to specify clearly
the goals and objectives of purchasers, both in governing legislation and
in transparent management contracts. This should facilitate monitoring
by the central government of purchasers' performance relative to those
52. The Clinton Blueprint, supra note 27 at 102-110.
53. See W. van de Ven & F. Rutten, "Managed Competition In The Netherlands: Lessons
From Five Years Of Health Care Reform" (1995) 18 Aust. Health Rev. 9.
54. It should be noted that in New Zealand significant user charges apply for general
practitioner, drugs, and outpatient services and in the U.K. user charges apply to drugs.
55. NHS 1990 Act, supra note 17.
56. D. Longley, Health Care Constitutions (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 1996)
at 112.
57. (N.Z.), 1989, No. 142.
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objectives. Moreover, if purchasers' objectives are clearly and publicly
articulated then because of the potential for adverse publicity it is difficult
for the purchasers and for central government (as their political masters)
to retreat from these objectives in pursuit of their own self-interest. The
difficult question is what objectives and responsibilities should be
specified and what weight should be accorded to each.
In the U.K., the Health Authorities are required to implement direc-
tions received from the Secretary of State with respect to the exercise of
their functions under the National Health Service and Community Care
Act and with respect to the application of government money.58 Apart
from directions with respect to special hospitals and the establishment of
Community Health Councils (which must be incorporated in regula-
tions), there does not appear to be a legislative requirement that these
directions be publicized. 9 A "Code of Accountability" is intended to
serve as an informal contract between the central government and the
Health Authorities, but the Code does not create any statutory duties."
The statutory objectives of New Zealand's Regional Health Authorities
are couched in general terms, but they are specifically required to meet
the Crown's objectives as notified to them.61 Every such notification is
required to be published in the Gazette and tabled in the House of
Representatives .62
Both in New Zealand and the U.K. the central government publishes
annual guidelines setting out the purchasers' objectives in general terms.
The U.K. government issues in June of each year a policy document
informing the Health Authorities of their purchasing intentions for the
following year. For the 1997/98 year there are three sets of objectives:
long-term objectives and policies, medium-term priorities and objectives
for the 1997/98 year, and baseline requirements and objectives for the
1997/98 year. 63 In the longer term, performance will be assessed under
three headings: equity, efficiency, and responsiveness.64 The New Zealand
58. NHS 1990 Act, supra note 17, s. 17 & s. 97 (7) (as amended by the Health Authorities Act
(U.K.) 1995,c. 17, s. 47.).
59. Ibid., s.18.
60. A. Belcher, "Codes of Conduct and Accountability for NHS Boards" (1995) Pub. L. 288;
Longley, supra note 56 at 121.
61. NZ Health 1993 Act, supra note 19, slO.
62. Ibid., s.8(5).
63. See Priorities And Planning Guidance For The NHS: 1997/98 (Leeds: NHS Executive,
June 1996) (hereinafter U.K. Planning Guidance 1997/98).
64. Six medium term priorities were set for the 1997/98 year: to work towards developing a
primary care led system; to review and maintain progress on the effective purchasing and
provision of comprehensive mental health services; to improve the clinical and cost effective
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government publishes in November of each year a policy document that
specifies the government's goals and objectives for the health system.
These guidelines are used by the Regional Health Authorities to help
them formulate their annual plans and to negotiate funding agreements
with the central government. In the 1996/97 policy document, the
government set out six principles to provide a framework for purchasing
decisions: equity, effectiveness, efficiency, safety, acceptability, and risk
management .6 The government specifies more detailed objectives within
those general principles .
66
It is not sufficient simply to fix goals and objectives-the results must
be monitored. Propper notes that monitoring efforts in the U.K. have been
concentrated on a small set of dimensions of output: annual growth in
activity, waiting times, and targets for improvements in the health of
certain groups of the population. 67 Thus, Propper argues, the Health
Authorities will focus their efforts on those aspects of performance being
monitored and not others. The New Zealand government is attempting to
develop performance indicators to gauge how well Regional Health
Authorities are meeting their objectives.68 To date, however, the central
government monitoring unit has been able only to describe current
utilization patterns, and there has yet to be any comprehensive evaluation
or attempted comparison of purchasers' performances.69 It is signifi-
ness of services; to give greater voice and influence to users; to ensure that integrated services
are in place to meet the continuing health care needs of the elderly, disabled, vulnerable people,
and children; and to encourage public organizations to be good employers. Baseline require-
ments and objectives set include the attainment of specific goals relating to the reduction of the
incidence of coronary heart disease, stroke, cancers, suicide, gonorrhoea, and accidents, and
the attainment of specific targets for waiting times for health services; ibid. at 11-21.
65. Minister of Health, Policy Guidelines For Regional Health Authorities 1996/97 (publi-
cation details not given in the document but presumably published in Wellington by the
Ministry of Health in November 1995) [hereinafter 1996/97N.Z. Policy Guidelines] at 11-12.
66. As an example, in terms of equity, the Regional Health Authorities are required to
"improve access... to health and disability services in terms of waiting times, geographical
accessibility, and affordability" and give "relatively greater weighting to health gain for those
people with lower health status in all population groups, and ... greater weighting to Maori and
child health gain." In terms of efficiency, Regional Health Authorities are required, where a
choice of effective services for addressing a given health problem exists, to choose the most
cost-effective service; ibid. at 11.
67. C. Propper, "Agency and Incentives in the NHS Internal Market" (1995) 40 Soc. Sci.
Med. 1683 at 1685.
68. These objectives include: securing better health; ensuring the acceptability of services;
obtaining better and fairer access to services; ensuring that services are better targeted to needs;
obtaining more services for money ("efficiency") and minimizing financial risk; see Purchas-
ing For Your Health: A Performance Report on the First Year of the Regional Health
Authorities and Public Health Commission (Wellington: Ministry of Health, 1995) [hereinaf-
ter Performance Report] at 10-11.
69. Ibid. at 142.
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cantly easier to focus on and pursue those goals and objectives that are
easily measurable, such as increased turnover or reduced waiting lists,
than those that are defined in a more abstract or general way such as
enhancing people's satisfaction with the health system or maintaining
and improving the quality of services delivered. Although a balance must
be struck between the benefits of monitoring and the transactions costs
associated with monitoring, 0 it would seem important that central
governments should give weight to a broad range of performance indices
and not simply focus on those that are easiest to measure.
In addition to setting goals and monitoring results, it is also important
to ensure that there are incentives built into management contracts. Allen
concludes that the present structure of the U.K. internal market provides
no penalties for purchasers that arrange "bad" contracts for supply, yet
such arrangements will deny patients care in the same way as the alleged
inefficiencies of the old command-and-control system.7 ' Similarly in
New Zealand, although financial incentives are reportedly included in
contracts for managers of the Crown Health Enterprises (government-
owned corporations that run the public hospitals), there are no incentives
built into contracts for managers of Regional Health Authorities, apart
from the prospect of dismissal.72 The lack of attention to incentives that
influence purchasers is contradictory given that a proactive purchaser is
essential to the internal market model, which relies on purchasers to
contract astutely with competing providers for a variety of health care
services. There is also a question of the amount of resources devoted to
the purchasing authorities. Due to insufficient investment (in terms of
human and capital resources) one manager suggested that the best that can
be hoped for on the part of New Zealand Regional Health Authorities is
that they will act as a form of passive insurer.73 This statement is
particularly illuminating given that it was intended the Authorities would
be anything but passive payers. There is also a question of the skill level
of the people who comprise purchasing authorities. Decision-makers
need the incentives, skills and resources necessary to make decisions over
time that strike the right balance between patients' needs and societal
interest and between equity and efficiency.
70. A. Mason & K. Moran, "Purchaser-Provider: The International Dimension" (1995) 310
Br. Med. J. 23 1.
71. P. Allen, "Contracts in the National Health Service Internal Market" (1995) 58 Mod. L.
Rev. 321 at 339.
72. See Flood, supra note 43 at 98.
73. Dr. R. Naden, "Contracting To Purchase Health And Disability Services: An RHA
Perspective" in Contracting in the Health Sector (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation,
1994) 64 at 66.
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Unlike private firm managers, managers within a government-ap-
pointed purchaser do not bear the risk of job loss associated with
insolvency or takeover. The central government could, however, negoti-
ate management contracts that tied salaries of managers to a comprehen-
sive range of performance measures.74 A further possibility might be for
government to request tenders for management contracts. 5 The greatest
difficulty with all incentives designed to enhance the performance of
purchasers lies in the difficulty of measuring and comparing perfor-
mance.7 6 Smith notes that in reality, any system of ensuring performance
in health care delivery will be incomplete and imprecise and may
encourage providers to "concentrate on the quantifiable at the expense of
the unquantifiable. '77 One conceivable means around this problem is to
tag graduated bonus payments for each and every element of perfor-
mance, with management being paid more or less depending on how they
are perceived as having performed by a monitoring unit within central
government.78 This should help encourage purchasers to compete on
those aspects of performance that are more abstract as well as those that
are easy to measure.
Despite well-crafted incentives, the central government's propensity
to monitor an agency's performance will be limited as it is itself an agent
at this level for the general public, and public choice problems arise.
79
Thus, it is important to consider what incentives purchasers have to be
directly accountable to the people of the region they represent. Two broad
types of incentives, "voice" (political accountability) and "exit" (market
accountability) are described further below. Another broad type of
incentive is professional accountability. Professional accountability oc-
curs where self-regulating professions monitor and regulate the behaviour
and standards of individuals within the profession to ensure the quality
and standards of health services for patients. It is undoubtedly an
important mechanism and, historically, has been relied on as the key if not
74. See Flood supra note 43 at 98.
75. Propper, supra note 67 at 1688 speculates about the possibility of introducing franchises
for the purchasing role. The problem with this idea is that long-term contracts would likely be
required in order for management to develop the skills and knowledge required to manage the
purchasing agency effectively, and it may subsequently prove very difficult to replace existing
management with incumbency advantages.
76. See Flood supra note 43 at 98-99.
77. P. Smith, "Information Systems and the White Paper Proposals" in A. J. Culyer, A. K.
Maynard & J. W. Posnett, eds., Competition in Health Care: Reforming the NHS (Hampshire:
MacMillan Press, 1990) at 119.
78. Hood, supra note 43 at 98.
79. Ibid. at 99.
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only means by which to ensure the quality and effectiveness of health
services supplied. Professional accountability may, arguably, have pro-
tected patients from the worst effects of severe and quickly implemented
cost-cutting initiatives in many jurisdictions. However, self-regulation
may also serve to protect vested interests and maintain the status quo in
terms of the distribution of income generated from the supply of health
services, and with regard to the range and quality of health services
supplied.8" Clearly, professional accountability is being increasingly
questioned in terms of its effectiveness as a regulatory tool and other
measures to ensure accountability deamd on consideration.
IV. Hirschman 's Voice and Exit
Albert Hirschman in his celebrated book, Exit, Voice and Loyalty,
describes how market and political forces can act in tandem as efficiency-
enhancing mechanisms in both the public and private sectors .8 The first
concept he describes is that of "exit," which is a means of ensuring the
accountability of decision-makers through a competitive market. As I
have noted elsewhere,
when a dissatisfied customer shifts custom from one firm to another
(exits), she not only improves her own personal welfare, but if sufficient
other dissatisfied customers exit, then this action in aggregate sends a clear
signal to the firm from which customers are exiting that it must remedy
inefficiencies or become insolvent. Exit requires no direct communication
between the dissatisfied customer and the firm and may thus be a relatively
cheap means for an individual to improve her/his own welfare and,
indirectly, overall welfare. Exit cannot work, however, as a mechanism in
monopoly markets (apart from consumers electing to abstain from con-
suming the product or service altogether) and may work less well in
oligopolistic markets where there is the risk of producer collusion.82
The success of exit as a mechanism also depends upon the assumption
that consumers have all the information they need to make efficient
choices.
The second concept that Hirschman describes is that of "voice," which
is generally associated with ensuring accountability through political
80. Evans has made the point for many years that all money spent on health services in one
form or another results in income for health service providers; R. G. Evans, Strained Mercy -
The Economics of Canadian Health Care (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) at 281 and 13 years
later see Evans, supra note 2 at 440.
81. A. 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty - Responses to Decline in Firms, Organiza-
tions, and States, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
82. Flood, supra note 43 at 100.
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processes.83 Voice is any attempt to change a firm or organization from
within rather than trying to avoid the problem by exit. By comparison
with exit, voice is "messy," costly, and its effectiveness is dependent
upon "the influence and bargaining power that customers and members
can bring to bear within the firm from which they buy or the organizations
to which they belong."84 Those individuals who are most concerned
about the quality of an organization's performance and would be most
likely to have the political influence necessary to achieve improvement
are primafacie also those most likely to exit to another organization when
quality begins to decline.85
It is important to underscore Hirschman's view that there is no
prescription for the combination of exit and voice that will be the most
efficiency-enhancing. Moreover, over time, as markets and institutions
evolve and circumstances change, the appropriate levels of exit and voice
will also change.86 Hirschman also notes that if exit is too easy an option
then a crucial number of customers may depart before the firm has had an
opportunity to correct its performance, thus resulting in its insolvency
and, in some instances, welfare losses.87 Thus, in some firms and
organizations it is important to foster "loyalty" so that individuals will use
voice and lobby for improvement and give the organization or firm time
to make any necessary adjustments before resorting to exit.
As I will discuss, in internal market systems like New Zealand and the
U.K., citizens have no choice as to who acts as their purchaser of publicly-
funded health services. Thus, these citizens rely upon voice to ensure the
performance of government-appointed purchasers. The mechanism of
voice is diluted by the fact that in both New Zealand and the U.K. there
are supplementary private health insurance schemes covering services
that are also provided by the public system.88 There is some opportunity
for exit to work as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism in the context of
the U.K.'s GP Fundholders as, in theory at least, citizens should be able
to shift from Fundholder to Fundholder taking with them a risk-adjusted
share of public-funding. In managed competition proposals and reforms
in the U.S. and Netherlands, exit (in theory) is the primary means by
83. Hirschman,supra note 81 at 30-43.
84. Ibid. at 40.
85. Ibid. at 51.
86. Ibid. at 124 notes: "[i]t is very unlikely that one could specify a most efficient mix (of exit
and voice) that would be stable over time. The reason is simple: each recovery mechanism is
itself subject to the forces of decay which have been invoked here all along."
87. Ibid. at 24.
88. See C. M. Flood, "Will Supplementary Private Insurance Reduce Waiting Lists?" (1996)
11 Canadian Health Facilities Law Guide 1.
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which to ensure the performance of purchasers offering managed care
plans.
V. Voice And Political Accountability
How may voice work to improve the accountability of government-
appointed purchasers in the U.K. and New Zealand? Here I examine five
mechanisms to improve voice: devolution, election, consultation, char-
ters of rights and Ombudspersons, and capture of the politically
influential.
1. Devolution
The first question to consider is what opportunities citizens have to
influence their purchaser's decision-making processes. This too is an
important question for Canada as a recent popular reform initiative in
every province except Ontario has been to devolve responsibility for
health care allocation to regional boards .9 In New Zealand there are four
Regional Health Authorities, each responsible for populations of be-
tween approximately 680,000 and I million people. As of 1 July 1997
there is one national purchasing agency responsible for the whole
population of 3.6 million.9" The extent to which purchasing power will
actually be consolidated as a result of this most recent reform is perhaps
overstated given that four regional offices will remain in place. In the
U.K. there are (since 1 April 1996) 100 Health Authorities which are
responsible for varying populations ranging from roughly 125,000 up to
just over a million, the operations of which are overseen by 8 branches or
outposts of the NHS Executive (an agency within the Department of
Health).9
The large size of New Zealand's Regional Health Authorities and the
U.K.'s new Health Authorities will be conducive to rationalizing and
coordinating the purchase of health services, but this benefit must be
weighed against the difficulty people may experience in having their
voice heard by a large and distant administrative body. Conceivably,
responsibility for purchasing services could be further devolved in order
89. See J. Lomas, J. Woods & G. Veenstra, "Devolving Authority for Health Care in
Canada's Provinces: An Introduction to the Issues" (1997) 156 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 371.
90. The 1991 census night population was 3.435 million and the 1996 census population
was3.681 million - Statistics New Zealand, http://www.stats.govt.nz/statsweb.nsf/cc.
91. News Release by the Department of Health, 96/106, I April 1996, "Changes To Health
Service Structure Release £139 Million For Patient Care".
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to improve opportunities for the use of voice. The difficulty is that
devolution will result in additional transactions costs and in a diminution
of monopsony purchasing power. 92 The degree to which diminution of
market power on the demand side will be a problem will depend on the
structure of the supply side of the health service market in question. This
is likely to be a particular problem in areas which are not densely
populated, in which case the prospect for competition on the supply side
seems remote. If the large size of purchasers renders voice ineffective as
an accountability-enhancing mechanism, but further devolution is unac-
ceptable because of increased transactions costs and diminution of
monopsony power, then nothing would seem to be lost from the further
centralization of purchasing power.
The agency problem is complicated by the devolution of responsibility
for the purchasing of health services from the central government to
various regional agencies. The public's attention is fragmented between
central government, purchasers, and public and private providers. It may
be difficult to know to whom complaints and concerns should be
addressed, rendering voice less effective as a mechanism for improving
the quality of decision-making. This fragmentation problem is poten-
tially very serious as important areas of responsibility could be avoided
successfully by all parties. Thus, somewhat counter-intuitively, voice as
a mechanism for enhancing accountability may be aided by the central-
ization of responsibility for purchasing health services. Possibly it was
hoped that delegating responsibility for health allocation decisions to
government-appointed purchasers in the U.K. and New Zealand would
dilute the political ramifications of hard decisions for the central govern-
ment.93 If this was in fact a goal it has not been realized, for a clear result
of the reform process in both countries has been the continued politicization
of health allocation issues at the central government level.94 This
92. In the U.S., several studies have shown that large insurers are able to extract discounts
from providers. See, for example, F. A. Sloan & E. R. Becker, "Cross-subsidies And Payment
For Hospital Care" (1984) 8 J. Health Pol. Policy & Law 660. In those countries where
government expenditures account for the great majority of total health expenditures, govern-
ment has been able to use its monopsony purchasing power to control costs; Health Care Study
Group Report, "Understanding the Choices in Health Care Reform" (1994) 19 J. of Health Pol.
Policy & Law 499.
93. K. Hawkins, ed., The Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 12 notes that
"[s]ometimes, of course, law-makers want to remain as silent as possible on controversial or
complex matters of public policy; in these circumstances, awards of discretion to legal
bureaucracies allow legislatures to duck or fudge hard issues."
94. A. J. Culyer & A. Meads, "The United Kingdom: Effective, Efficient, Equitable?" (1992)
17 J. Health Pol. Policy & Law 667 at 684 note that the absence of locally elected Health
Authorities, rather than eliminating politics from the decision-making process, simply trans-
mits the problem to higher levels of government. Similarly, G. Wilson notes that the reformed
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politicization of the health system is reinforced by the central government's
continued interference in the operation of both purchasers and providers
in both New Zealand and the U.K.95
In addition to the 100 Health Authorities in the U.K., there are over
3,500 Fundholders involving around 10,000 general practitioners, who
act as purchasers for approximately 40% of the population for a limited
range of health services.96 Fundholding is a form of managed care and
Fundholders receive a capitated budget with which to buy drugs and
elective surgical services.97 Paying by means of capitation and transfer-
ring financial risk to health providers is essentially a way of devolving
purchasing responsibility to a local level. Fundholding can be viewed as
separate from the purchaser/provider split characteristic of the balance of
internal market reforms in the U.K. Fundholders are both purchasers and
providers and can substitute, subject to licensing and other specialty
regulation, their own services for services they may otherwise purchase
from other health providers. By comparison Health Authorities must
contract out for the supply of all services.
Given a fixed capitated budget with which to buy services on behalf of
patients, the physicians who comprise a Fundholder have a primafacie
incentive to purchase the most cost-effective mix of services on the part
of their patients. One of the positive features of GP Fundholding, as with
other forms of managed care,is that it may provide an incentive to provide
primary and preventive care so as to keep the Fundholders' enrollees
healthy and thus in less need of more expensive acute and institutional
services. The attraction of the Fundholding concept is, in theory, that a
patient has a close relationship with his or her physician and thus a
physician, acting as a purchaser, is more likely to be responsive to a
patient's expressed preferences (voice) within the limitations of the
physician's budget. Of course, the larger the number of physicians
making up the Fundholding consortium the greater the likelihood that any
individual physician will be distanced from management decisions. In
theory, if a Fundholder is unresponsive to voice then a patient may exit
New Zealand system has not managed to depoliticize decisions in primary or secondary care;
G. Wilson "Health Purchasing: A Regional Health Authority Perspective" (1995) 18 Public
Sector 11. See also Longley, supra note 56 at 123.
95. For examples in New Zealand see Flood supra note 43 at 105, n. 72.
96. See generally the Audit Commission, What The Doctor Ordered: A Study Of GP
Fundholders In England And Wales (London: HMSO, 1996) (hereinafter What the Doctor
Ordered). See also "The NHS: A White Paper" supra note 22.
97. Ibid. at 6. Standard Fundholders do not purchase the following sorts of hospital care:
emergency admissions, inpatient mental health, costs above £6000 per annum for any patient,
accident and emergency, maternity, and medical inpatients.
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to another Fundholder or exit to a non-Fundholding general practitioner
(in which case the relevant Health Authority would purchase all ser-
vices). In both cases there would be a consequent loss of income for the
Fundholder.
The critical question is whether improvements in the quality of
services from a patient's perspective (i.e. shortened waiting times,
improved facilities, and greater choice) and from a societal perspective
(i.e. better health outcomes in terms of lower incidences of disease, faster
recovery and return to work etc.) result in the benefits of Fundholding
outweighing the costs. It is very difficult to quantify in monetary terms
the value of improvements in service quality in a publicly-financed
system. Initially it did appear that Fundholders were achieving improve-
ments in both the quality and range of services purchased for patients.
This result may have been, however, only a function of the character of
those who elected to become Fundholders at the commencement of the
reforms. As the number of Fundholders has grown, the reports on
Fundholders' performances have been far more mixed. 98
There is a concern that the rapid growth of Fundholding has dimin-
ished the Health Authorities' power to plan and coordinate the delivery
of services to a large population.99 Concern has also been raised regarding
a perceived lack of accountability of GP Fundholders.' °° Unlike Health
Authorities or NHS Trusts, Fundholders are not subject to an annual audit
by the Audit Commission. The Audit Commission's 1996 report criti-
cized the lack of monitoring of Fundholders by Health Authorities.'°l The
U.K. government has attempted to respond to these criticisms; however,
the difficulty remains that Health Authorities are themselves purchasers
and requiring them to regulate Fundholders creates a conflict of interest
and blurs the responsibilities of Health Authorities.10 2 It would seem
more appropriate for the NHS Executive (i.e., the central government) to
98. See in general What The Doctor Ordered, supra note 96.
99. J. Shapiro & C. Ham, "The New Health Authorities" (1996) 2: 2 Health Services
Management Centre Newsletter (University of Birmingham) 1.
100. A. Harrison, ed., King's Fund Policy Institute, Health Care U.K. 1994/95: An Annual
Review of Health Care Policy, (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, 1995) [hereinafter"Health Care UK
1994/95"] at 4 which notes "GPs are independent contractors: their contracts are broadly
drawn, giving them massive scope for exercising discretion in the way they use the resources
at their disposal, a discretion which they are currently able to use without being called to
account."
101. What The Doctor Ordered, supra note 96 at 63 and generally 64-79.
102. See An Accountability Framework For GP Fundholders (March 1995) as quoted by
Longley, supra note 56 at 132.
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regulate directly the activities of both Health Authorities and
Fundholders. °03
Concerns about Fundholders' accountability might be thought to be
addressed by the prospect of exit by patients (with a share of public
funding) to other Fundholders and to Health Authorities. However, it
seems that is it not part of the U.K. patient culture for patients (yet) to
switch readily. There is no evidence that patients are moving between
Fundholders or from non-Fundholding physicians to Fundholders for
reasons other than changing address)0 4 The advantages and disadvan-
tages of exit as an accountability-enhancing mechanism are more fully
explored in the next section of this paper. It should be noted, however, that
in terms of competition between purchasers, Fundholders have a com-
petitive advantage over Health Authorities for a number of reasons.
Firstly, Fundholders have not had to compete with respect to a full range
of services. Secondly, the budget allocation received by Fundholders is
higher than that received by Health Authorities for non-Fundholding
patients. The initial enthusiasm that general practitioners have shown for
Fundholding may wane if their "generous" cash allowances disappear
and they are reimbursed on a risk-rated capitation formula.10 5 Thirdly,
individuals can only "exit" with their share of public funding to the Health
Authority if they can find a general practitioner to enroll with who is not
a Fundholder. A bias is created in favour of GP Fundholders as it is
impossible for Health Authorities to lure patients back from a
Fundholder.10 6 Thus competition for patient allegiance can only really
exist between Fundholders. Finally, Health Authorities often have no
alternative but to contract with NHS Trusts for the provisions of most
services. NHS Trusts can thus afford to save their best deals for GP
Fundholders so as to obtain extra marginal revenue.
103. Fundholders are accountable to the NHS Executive (through its regional offices) but
day-to-day management is normally through the Health Authorities.
104. See K. Thomas, J. Nicholl & P. Coleman, "Assessing The Outcome Of Making It Easier
For Patients To Change General Practitioner: Practice Characteristics Associated With Patient
Movements" (1995) 45 Br. J. Gen. Practice 581.
105. A. Maynard & K. Bloor, "Introducing A Market To The United Kingdom's National
Health Service" (1996) 334 New Eng. J. Med. 604 at 606.
106. Propper, supra note 67 at 1686 notes that "[t]he nature of competition between the
District Health Authorities and GP Fundholders is also one-sided; a good District Health
Authority cannot win back patients from a poor GP Fundholder unless the Fundholder chooses
to relinquish its purchasing role."
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2. Election of Members of Purchasing Agency
One means of improving voice as an accountability mechanism may be
for the public to elect the members of the purchasing institutions. Voice
is enhanced, for the members know that if they are not responsive to their
constituents they may well be voted out of power at the next election.
Locally-elected members may be more responsive to the exercise of
voice by people within the communities they represent and may be more
representative of them. In contrast, Longley notes that members of the
business community are disproportionately over-represented on the
U.K.'s government-appointed Health Authorities and that in no sense can
it be said that the Authorities are representative of the communities they
serve. 107
The reason often offered for eschewing the possibility of citizens
electing the boards of their own purchasers is that government-appointed
purchasers will be independent of the political process and this will help
to reduce public choice costs. In fact, it is far from clear that devolving
responsibility to government-appointed purchasers will reduce public
choice problems given that the members thereof rely on the continued
support of the government who appointed them to their positions."°8
The primary problem with reliance on election as a means of ensuring
accountability is that many citizens will have to rely on members for
whom they may have not voted and with whose policies they do not
agree.'°9 Moreover, it is unclear whether the decisions made by an elected
body would reflect the preferences of any citizen, or would result in a
series of compromises that satisfied no-one." ' 0 There is also the potential
problem that elected boards would be dominated by members of the
medical profession, who clearly would have a much greater interest in
being so elected than ordinary members of the public.
3. Consultation
Imposing a duty on purchasers to consult widely with the people they
represent may overcome problems of access by citizens to large govern-
ment-appointed purchasers. In the U.K., regulations require Health
107. Longley, supra note 56 at 116 and 122.
108. Flood, supra note 43 at 105 and see generally J. A. Morone, "The Ironic Flaw in Health
Care Competition: The Politics of Market" in R. J. Arnould, R. F. Rich & W. D. White, eds.,
Competitive Approaches to Health Care Reform, (Washington D.C: Urban Institute Press,
1993) at 207.
109. Flood, ibid.
110. See M. J. Trebilcock, "An Introduction to Law and Economics" (unpublished mimeo,
University of Toronto, 14 August 1996) at 50.
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Authorities to consult with Community Health Councils"' on any
proposals which the Authority may have under consideration for any
"substantial development" or "substantial variation" in the provision of
health services in a particular area."' At least half the members of a
Community Health Council are appointed by the local government and
each relevant local government has one representative thereon. At least
one-third of the Council members are appointed by voluntary organiza-
tions. Purchaser or provider interests are not permitted to be represented
on the Councils.' 3 However, each Health Authority must make arrange-
ments to ensure that it receives advice appropriate for enabling it
effectively to exercise its statutory functions from "medical practitioners,
registered nurses and registered midwives" and "other persons with
professional expertise in and experience of health care."'
In New Zealand, each Regional Health Authority is required, in
accordance with its statement of intent, to consult "on a regular basis"
with "regard to its intentions relating to the purchase of services" with
such of the following as the authority considers appropriate: "(a) Indi-
viduals and organizations from the communities served by it who receive
or provide health services or disability services; (b) Other persons
including voluntary agencies, private agencies, departments of State, and
territorial authorities."' '5
Currently, legislation in New Zealand and in the U.K. places a similar
emphasis on consultation with citizens as it does with health profession-
als and providers. The policy reason for this is likely the assumption that
in a publicly-funded system it is important to obtain the cooperation of
health providers, perhaps so that they will be less resistant to foregoing
the financial rewards of an unregulated private sector. However, placing
the same weight on consulting providers as on consulting the people that
the purchasers are meant to represent undermines the role of purchasers
111. There appear to be 207 Community Health Councils in the U.K.; see http://www.ukpc.org/
pub/chclist.htm.
112. See generally the Community Health Councils Regulations (U.K.) 1996, S. 1. 1996/640,
s. 18. Section 18(3) provides there is no duty to consult where the Authority is satisfied that "in
the interest of the health service" a decision has to be taken without allowing time for
consultation.
113. However, prior to 1 April 1996, U.K. purchasing agencies were under a wide duty to
recognize local advisory committees representing different health professions in the relevant
district or region and to consult with these committees; see the Health Authorities Act (U.K.)
1995, c.17, s.4, s.5, & Sch. 6.
114. The National Health Service Act (U.K.), 1977, c.49, s.12(1) as amended by the Health
Authorities Act, supra note 113.
115. NZHealth 1993 Act, supra note 19, s.34.
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as agents for those people. Moreover, as purchasers may be "captured"
by provider groups during the consultation process, it may be inappropri-
ate to require purchasers to consult providers.116 This does not meant that
purchasers should not consult health providers but rather that greater
weight should be given to consulting citizens.
4. Charters of Rights and Health Services Commissioners
Another means of enhancing voice is to stipulate through a "charter of
rights" what citizens can expect in terms of entitlements and standards of
performance. The use of charters and codes of rights is a means of
providing information to patients." 7 Establishment of an independent
Health Service Commissioner (acting as a form of health Ombudsperson)
also provides a forum for people to voice their concerns.
In the U.K., the Patients' Charter sets out the national standards
regarding what patients can expect in terms of access and treatment from
the publicly-financed system. At the regional level, Health Authorities
and NHS Trusts (which manage the public hospitals) are encouraged to
negotiate even higher standards and every year Health Authorities
publish an annual report on each hospital's performance on Charter
standards. The Patients' Charter, introduced on 1 April 1995, expressly
states (among other things) how long patients should expect to have to
wait for various services." 8 The Charter also sets out patients' rights and
expectations with respect to general practitioner, community, ambu-
lance, dental, optical, and pharmaceutical services.
The U.K.'s Health Services Commissioner may investigate a com-
plaint from a person who "has sustained injustice or hardship" as a
consequence of "a failure in a service provided by a health service body,
a failure of such a body to provide a service which it was a function of the
body to provide, or maladministration in connection with any other action
taken by or on behalf of such a body.""19 The scope of the Commissioner's
authority was recently extended to allow her or him to hear complaints
regarding all aspects of publicly funded health services and to hear
116. Flood, supra note 43 at at 104.
117. B. Ferguson, "Progress of the UK Health Reforms And The Role Of Information: What
Can the 'Dismal Science' Contribute?", Discussion Paper 145 (York: Centre for Health
Economics, University of York, 1996) at 13.
118. The Charter notes that patients can expect to be seen immediately in Accident and
Emergency Department, to be seen within 18 months for inpatient or day case services, within
12 months for coronary revascularizations and associated procedures, and within 26 weeks for
a first consultant outpatient appointment with 90% of patients being seen within 13 weeks; NHS
Waiting Times Good Practice Guide, January 1996, (Leeds: NHS Executive, 1996) at 2.
119. The Health Service Commissioners Act (U.K.),1993, c.46, s.3.
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complaints regarding the clinical judgments of doctors, nurses, and other
clinical professionals. 2 ° The list of bodies subject to investigation has
also been extended to include independent providers and family health
service providers. However, the Act continues to provide that the Com-
missioner is unable to question the merits of a decision taken by a body
in the course of exercising any discretion vested in that body except in the
case of maladministration. 2 ' This provision is consistent with case law
reflecting a general reluctance on the part of courts to intervene in the
rationing and allocation decisions made by government authorities and
providers within the U.K.'s National Health Service.'22
In New Zealand, a code of rights for health and disability service
consumers was brought into force on 1 July 1996.123 The ten rights
provided for in the code are couched in very general terms. 24 Unlike the
U.K. Patients' Charter, there are no specific statements of rights and
expectations with respect to waiting lists and waiting times. The code
frames rights in the context of the consumers' relationships with health
care providers and not in the context of consumers' relationships with
purchasers. Moreover, the Act states that providers will not be found in
breach of the code if they have taken "reasonable actions in the circum-
stances to give effect to the rights, and comply with the duties" in the code,
although the onus is on the provider to prove that it took reasonable
actions.2 5 Consumers may appeal to a Health and Disability Services
Commissioner in the event of a failure to implement these rights. 26 The
120. See the Health Services Commissioners (Amendment) Act (U.K.), 1996, c.5.
121. The Health Service Commissioners Act (U.K.),1993, c.46, s.3(4) & s.3(5).
122. For a discussion of these cases see J. H. Tingle, "The Allocation Of Healthcare
Resources in the National Health Service In England: Professional and Legal Issues" (1993)
2 Ann. Health L. 195. More recently see R. v. Cambridge Health Authority, exp. B., [1995]
2All ER 129 (C .A.) at 130 where it was noted "[thejudiciary] ...was not in a position to decide
on the correctness of the difficult and agonizing judgements which had to be made by health
authorities as to how a limited budget was best allocated to the maximum advantage of the
maximum number of patients."
123. See the Health and Disability Commissioner (Code Of Health And Disability Services
Consumers' Rights) Regulations (N.Z.), 1996/78.
124. The ten rights are: to be treated with respect; to freedom from discrimination,coercion,
harassment, and exploitation; to dignity and independence; to services of an appropriate
standard; to effective communication; to be fully informed; to make an informed choice and
give informed consent; to support; to make a complaint about the provision of health or
disability services; and for the code of rights to apply when a consumer is participating or it is
proposed that the consumer participate in teaching or research.
125. The Health and Disability Commissioner (Code Of Health And Disability Services
Consumers' Rights) Regulations (N.Z.), 1996/78, s.3.
126. See the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 (N.Z.), 1994, No. 88.
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powers of the Commissioner are relatively limited. 27 She may, however,
refer a matter to the Director of Proceedings who in turn may institute
disciplinary proceedings before the Complaints Review Tribunal which
has power to award damages, make declarations and order and grant such
other relief to the complainant as the Tribunal thinks fit. 2
Entitlements in both the U.K. and New Zealand are couched in the
context of the patient/provider relationship rather than the citizen/pur-
chaser relationship. Without discounting the need for the former, there is
a need for a formal codification of the minimum entitlements and rights
of a citizen vis--vis his or her purchaser. Presently, in both the U.K. and
New Zealand, access to a Health Services Commissioner does not assist
in improving the performance of the Health Authorities.
5. Capturing the Voice of the Politically Influential
In both the U.K. and New Zealand, citizens may purchase private
insurance to cover the cost of private services and user charges imposed
in the public sector. The existence of private insurance covering services
that are meant to be available to all in the publicly-funded system may
dilute the use of voice on the part of those holding private insurance who,
as a consequence, have less of a vested interest in the public system. 29
Prior to internal market reform, growing waiting lists were viewed as
stemming from the inefficiency and unresponsiveness of the U.K. and
New Zealand systems. Although reducing waiting times and waiting lists
was a goal of the reforms, New Zealand's new system has not solved this
problem. Waiting lists have increased by over fifty percent, from 62,000
in 1991 to a reported 93,930 people waiting as of March 1996.30 Waiting
lists are overwhelmingly for elective as opposed to acute surgery. The
New Zealand administration has reversed its position from arguing that
127. She has the power to investigate a complaint that there has been a breach of the code.
She may refer the matter to an "advocate" to resolve the complaint. If after an investigation the
Commissioner resolves there has been a complaint then she may, amongst other things report
her opinion and recommendations to a health professional body and/or make a complaint to that
body. If after a reasonable time no action is taken the Commission may make public comment
thereon and/or report the matter to the Minister of Health; ibid., ss. 36, 42, 45, & 46(2).
128. Ibid., s. 49 and s. 52.
129. This argument has been made before in earlier writing; C. M. Flood & M. J. Trebilcock,
"Voice And Exit In New Zealand's Health Care Sector" in Contracting in the Health Sector
(Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1994) at 37; Flood supra note 88; and Flood, supra
note 43 at 101.
130. 72,647 people were on waiting lists in 1993 and 77,558 people in 1994; S. Upton, supra
note 18 at 28 (1991 figure); Performance Report supra note 68, Table 17 at 85 (1993 and 1994
figures); L. Dalziel, Opposition health spokeswomen as cited by the New Zealand Herald (17
April 1996) (1996 figures).
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waiting lists were reflective of the inefficiencies of the old command-
and-control system 3' to arguing that waiting lists are not reflective of an
inefficient system and that waiting times are a more useful measure.
1 1
2
However, it seems likely that there will generally be a strong correlation
between the length of waiting lists and waiting times. Moreover, there are
no comprehensive statistics available to enable a comparison of average
waiting times before and after reform. The current administration's
response to the problem of lengthening waiting lists is simply to abolish
the present lists, and introduce a system of booking whereby patients will
not be put on a waiting list unless the system can meet their needs within
six months.'33 If a patient's needs cannot be met in this time-frame then
she/he will simply be referred back to their general practitioner for
management of their condition. If successfully implemented, this book-
ing system will artificially deflate waiting lists. As waiting lists have
increased so has the proportion of the population with private insurance:
from 35% in 1985, to 45% in 1993, to 55% in 1995."' The percentage of
total health expenditures paid for by private insurance has doubled, from
2.75% in 1990 to 6.18% in 1994.11
5
Using Hirschman's model we can see that part of the problem in New
Zealand may well lie in the fact that rather than using their voice to press
for improvements in the performance of the public health system with
regard to the supply of elective surgery, quality-conscious individuals are
simply seeking fulfillment of their elective surgery needs in the private
system. The effects of this are even more pernicious than might be first
envisaged because of what Hirschman describes as the "lazy monopoly"
problem.'36 A lazy monopoly (which in general operates in a market
where there is no competition for the market itself) may in fact have an
incentive to encourage those that would otherwise be likely to use their
voice to criticize the monopoly to move to another market. This phenom-
enon may, prima facie, appear like "exit" but it is not because the
131. S. Upton, ibid. at 11 where the then Minister of Health states that one of the problems
with the (pre-reform) system is that "public hospital waiting times are too long" and goes on
to refer interchangeably to the problem of long waiting times and long waiting lists.
132. See "Extracts From an Address by the Former Minister for Crown Health Enterprises
to the Auckland Divisional Conference of the New Zealand National Party, 25 June 1995,
Debunking The Myths And Restoring Reality" (1996) 4 Health Care Analysis 130 at 131.
133. 1996/97 NZ. Policy Guidelines, supra note 65 at 24-25.
134. Consumer Institute (July 1993) as cited by D. Muthumala & P. S. Howard, Health
Expenditure Trends In New Zealand 1980-1994, (Wellington: Ministry of Health, 1995) at
35 and Consumer Institute (June 1995) as cited by Anon., "Public Health Service Wins Praise
In Survey", New Zealand Herald (15 June 1995).
135. Muthumala & Howard, ibid. at 58, Appendix 4.
136. Hirschman supra note 81 at 59.
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decision-maker suffers no financial loss as a result of the movement of the
quality-conscious and politically influential to another market.
Hirschman's description of a lazy monopoly fits both New Zealand's
Regional Health Authorities and the U.K. Health Authorities, in that they
do not forego any part of their public funding as a result of the shift by
disgruntled citizens into the private sector for elective surgery. Thus,
purchasers have greater opportunity to operate inefficiently with fewer
demands placed upon their resources once quality-conscious individuals
have exited to the private sector.
As in New Zealand, most private insurance in the U.K. is used to cover
the cost of elective surgery. In fact, Propper and Maynard estimate that
less than two dozen procedures account for over 70% of all private
operations. 3 7 In contrast with New Zealand's striking failure to reduce
waiting lists, the U.K. seems to have been relatively more successful (at
least until more recent times) in reducing both waiting lists and waiting
times for elective surgery. The number of individuals waiting for elective
procedures fell by 2.9% in the period December 1994 to March 1995,138
at which point there were 1,040,161 people on waiting lists. Approxi-
mately the same number of people were on waiting lists at 30 September
1995."39 The number of people waiting for more than 12 months for
elective procedures on 30 September 1995 was 27,900-a reduction of
55% since September 1994, when there were 62,300.14 However, it
appears that waiting lists have started to increase once again with
1,207,500 waiting at the end of September 1997 (an increase of 1.5 % over
the previous quarter) and with the number of people waiting for more than
12 months increasing by 24%."1
The impetus to deal with waiting lists and times appears to have
originated from the central government, and through top-down control
137. C. Propper & A. Maynard, The Market for Private Health Care and the Demand for
Private Insurance in Britain, Discussion Paper No. 53 (York: University of York, 1989).
138. Health Care UK 1994195, supra note 100 at 38, Table 13.
139. There were 1,040,152 people on waiting lists at 30 September 1995,9 less than at March
1995; News Release by the Department of Health,96/ 1,1 January 1996, "Hospital Waiting List
Statistics Published."
140. News Release by the Department of Health, ibid. T. Besley, J. Hall & I. Preston, Private
Health Insurance and the State of the NHS, (Commentary No. 52) (London: The Institute for
Fiscal Studies, 1996) at Figure 3 similarly show a significant decline in the percentage of the
population on long term waiting lists after 1990.
141. J. Snell, "Action Team Appointed to Tacklc Rising Waiting Lists" (1997) Health
Services J. 4 as quoted by W. Bartlett,"Regulation, Trust and Incentives: Contractual Relations
and Performance in the NHS Quasi-Market" (Paper prepared for the conference Institutions,
Markets and (Economic) Performance: Deregulation and its Consequences, Utrecht Univer-
sity, 11-12 December 1997).
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the goal of containing waiting lists and times has become a primary goal
in the priorities set by the central government for purchasers to follow
and, consequentially, in agreements between purchasers and providers.
Patients are now also clearly informed of what they can expect in terms
of waiting times in the Patients' Charter. Clearly, while an undue fixation
on waiting lists and times at the expense of other goals may reduce
providers' flexibility in supplying health services, such a focus demon-
strates that the system (at least compared to one where waiting lists are
growing apace) is anchored in reality and not just in rhetoric to satisfying
end-users.
Why was the U.K. system, at least for a time, more proactive than the
New Zealand system in controlling waiting lists? There are two possible
reasons. First, there is the possibility that the presence of GP Fundholders
in the U.K. system results in more aggressive bargaining for the supply
of timely elective surgery. The evidence for this to date is mixed, although
arguably the mere prospect of competition between GP Fundholders and
Health Authorities has helped to improve the overall performance of the
system. Secondly, unlike New Zealand, the vast majority of people in the
U.K. rely on the public system for the delivery of all their services, such
that the political ramifications of not dealing with the waiting list
problems have become too high. Voice is thus being used by a sufficient
number of politically influential people to maintain and improve the
quality of the public health system. The percentage of the U.K.'s
population with private insurance has indeed grown in recent times but
is still only approximately 11.3%."' This is a relatively small percentage
in comparison with the estimated 55% of New Zealand's population with
private insurance. Given that nearly 89% of the U.K.'s population are
totally dependent on the public system for fulfillment of their elective
surgical needs, it could be assumed that much greater political pressure
has been brought to bear to reduce waiting times for elective surgery than
in New Zealand, where only 45% of the population is totally dependent
on the public system for elective surgery.
Empirical work conducted in the U.K. has examined the linkage
between length of waiting lists and uptake of private insurance. Besley,
Hall and Preston found that there is a positive association between the
purchase of private health insurance and length of local NHS waiting
lists. 143 They also found that individuals who express dissatisfaction with
the NHS are more likely to purchase private insurance and that the
142. 1993 figures estimated in Laing's Review of Private Healthcare 1994 (London: Lain &
Buisson Publications Ltd., 1994) at 140, Table 3.1.
143. T. Besley, J. Hall & I. Preston, supra note 140.
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privately insured tend to be "better off, better educated, middle-aged and
more inclined to support the Conservative party."'4 This provides some
evidence for the thesis that those who are most sensitive to quality issues
and are most likely to have the political connections with which to
exercise voice are more likely to "exit" by buying private insurance. The
authors of this study also found that individuals with private insurance
were less likely than those without to support additional spending on the
public system; however, this result must be treated with caution as a
significant majority of those with private insurance did support additional
spending on the NHS.145 This may possibly be explained by the fact that
those with private insurance still rely upon the public system for supply
of acute health care services, and the fact that relative to other OECD
countries the U.K. has spent a smaller amount on health than would be
predicted from its real level of GDP.
How could one change the incentives inducing quality-conscious and
wealthier individuals to buy private insurance covering services avail-
able in the public sector and enhance the use of voice? One method would
be to make exit more difficult. The first step is to remove all government
subsidies of private insurance and private supply of services that are
already provided in the public sector. On this basis one must question the
effect of the 1990 U.K. reform whereby private insurance premiums
became a tax-deductible item of expenditure for those aged over 60, and
the U.K. government's announcement in March 1997 that it will subsi-
dize private insurance covering long-term care for the elderly. 46 Taking
matters a step further, government could seek to reduce the incentive to
obtain private insurance for services that are provided in the public sector
by imposing a surcharge on premiums that purport to provide coverage
for those classes of services.
A more radical step would be to prohibit private insurance covering
those services that are available in the public sector. This is what Canada
does, albeit on a province by province basis."' Exit is made more difficult
as only those individuals who can afford to pay directly for the cost of
private care are able to exit the public sector. Evidence suggests that as
a consequence voice is strongly used as a mechanism to enhance the
144. Ibid. at I.
145. Ibid. at 34.
146. The Finance Act (U.K.) 1989, c.26, s.54. See The Economist (15 March 1997) at 18.
147. See, e.g., Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. A-24, s.17 and Ontario
Health Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s.14. However, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, and Saskatchewan do not appear to have explicit legislation prohibiting private
insurance that overlaps the public scheme.
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quality of Canada's health care system and to protect what are perceived
as being core values. 48 Certainly waiting lists are less of a problem in
Canada than in the U.K. and New Zealand. The Fraser Forum estimates
the number of Canadians on waiting lists for surgical procedures in 1995
to be 165,472.149 This equates to approximately 0.56% of the Canadian
population, which is a significantly smaller proportion than the 1.78% of
the U.K. population and the 2.62% of the New Zealand population on
waiting lists. 5° Some might wish to argue for supplementary private
insurance on the basis that the U.S. system relies predominantly on
private insurance and does not appear to have a problem with waiting
lists. This is, however, comparing apples with oranges, as the U.S. does
not attempt to achieve a universal health insurance system ensuring
access to health services on the basis of need as opposed to ability to pay.
Some argue that advocating the reduction of private insurance is
untenable as the existence of a private insurance market covering services
provided in the public sector eases the pressure on publicly-funded
services, and thus reduces waiting lists. Indeed, on the basis of this
assumption governments often subsidize the purchase of private insur-
ance and private care. However, Davis found that where there is a high
percentage of surgical beds in the private sector, the length of waiting lists
for public surgical beds proves to be at least twice as long as is likely if
no private surgical beds are provided. 5' This is plausible when it is
considered that only a portion of the population can or will utilize private
care (in the absence of government subsidies) as only a portion of the
population have health insurance or can afford to pay for private care
themselves. Recent experience in New Zealand indicates that according
a significant role to private insurance covering services that are meant to
be provided in the public system is not associated with a reduction in
waiting lists in the public system. Empirical analysis would be required
to identify the independent effect of the take-up of private supplementary
insurance on the length of waiting lists, but it is possible that the former
is exacerbating the latter. Possibly the waiting list problem in New
Zealand and the U.K. is caused by specialists who are employed both in
the public sector (where they are generally paid on a salary basis) and in
the private sector (where they are paid on a fee-for-service basis).'52 This
148. The National Forum, supra note 7 at 5 concluded in 1997 "..the health system has always
engendered strong support among Canadians. In recent years, however, its significance has
broadened into symbolic terms as a defining national characteristic."
149. Ramsay & Walker, supra note 8 at 6.
150. See Flood, supra note 43.
151. P. Davis, Health and Health Care in New Zealand, (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1981)
at 135.
152. Flood, supra note 43 at 103.
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incentive combination may mean that specialists are well served by long
waiting lists in the public sector which will increase demand for their
services in the private sector.
6. Conclusions on Voice and Political Accountability
In this section I have tried to address the various mechanisms through
which to enhance voice and thereby to render purchasers in internal
markets more accountable to the citizens they ultimately represent. As
Hirschman predicted, the use of voice is "messy" and there are no easy
or clear-cut solutions. Devolution of purchasing responsibility is one
means of improving voice and accountability, but the benefits have to be
weighed against the extra transactions costs and the diminution in
monopsony purchasing power associated with increasing the number of
purchasers. Consultation is another means of improving accountability
but there are difficulties with ensuring that purchasers are not captured by
vested interested groups and there is a need for incentives to make sure
that purchasers give more than lip-service to a requirement to consult.
Election of members of purchasing boards is, in a democracy, the most
obvious way of ensuring accountability. There are problems, however, as
more complex measures of performance such as the quality of services
supplied may be lost in the political process. Moreover, although the
majority of the population may be satisfied with the members of the
purchasing board they have elected, there will still be a significant portion
of the population who will not be satisfied. Ombudspersons and charters
of rights are important mechanisms through which to improve account-
ability but presently they seem to be geared towards the patient/provider
relationship rather than the patient/purchaser relationship. A key means
by which to improve voice in a publicly-financed system is to capture the
quality-conscious and politically influential individuals therein. In New
Zealand, the fact that 55% of the population hold supplementary private
insurance, allowing them to jump long queues for elective surgery in the
public sector, diminishes political pressure brought to bear on govern-
ment-appointed purchasers to remedy the problem.
It is possible that the many different mechanisms for voice could be
combined into an internal market system that would ensure the account-
ability of government-appointed purchasers to the citizens. What has
been seen to date in the U.K.'s and New Zealand's internal markets is a
significant level of rhetoric but insufficient attention to the goal of
improving the accountability of purchasers except in terms of cost-
containment.
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VI. Exit And Market Accountability
In addition to political accountability, purchasers' accountability may be
enhanced through a competitive market. If citizens were (to use
Hirschman's terminology) entitled to "exit" taking with them a risk-
adjusted share of government funding then, primafacie, there would be
unambiguous financial incentives encouraging the performance of pur-
chasers. Distributive justice concerns would be satisfied as the system
would be largely progressively financed. This is the premise of managed
competition reform proposals.
Offering consumers the choice of competing private purchasers is the
mechanism through which both efficiency and accountability are claimed
to be enhanced in Enthoven's model of managed competition reform, in
the partially-implemented Dutch reforms, and in President Clinton's
defunct reform proposals in the U.S. Limited competition between public
and private purchasers is being encouraged in the U.K. and New Zealand.
In the U.K., GP Fundholders (in theory) compete with each other and with
Health Authorities with regard to the purchase of a limited range of
services. In New Zealand there have been some initiatives, similar to
Fundholding in the U.K., through Independent Practice Associations.153
Thus limited competition between purchasers in the U.K.'s and New
Zealand's internal market is being incrementally introduced, albeit from
the "bottom up", as opposed to the "top down" process envisaged in
managed competition models.
The concept of exit as an accountability and efficiency-enhancing
mechanism is very appealing because of its apparent simplicity, particu-
larly when compared with the messy and varied mechanisms needed to
improve voice. Its elegance is that of the spontaneous order of competi-
tive markets envisaged by neo-classical economists. However, in man-
aged competition proposals distribution inequities have been corrected
by every individual receiving a fair share of public funding which they
may shift between competing purchasers, sending a clear signal to
competitors as to their relative performance. The theoretical appeal is
obvious but, as will become clear, the goal of redistribution means that
government must regulate and manage competition and consequently
issues of political accountability cannot be avoided.
In all proposals for managed competition, the process of competition
between purchasers is managed or regulated by what Enthoven terms
153. See Malcolm & Powell,supra note 21. Unlike GP Fundholders, however, it appears that
IPAs do not carry any significant financial .burden, with any shortfall being picked by the
relevant Regional Health Authority. This will surely have to change, however, as IPAs extend
into purchasing a full range of health services.
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"sponsors." Enthoven notes that managed competition reform requires
"intelligent, active, collective purchasing agents contracting with health
care plans on behalf of a large group of subscribers and continuously
structuring and adjusting the market to overcome attempts to avoid price
competition." 5 4 In Enthoven's model, a sponsor may be a governmental
agency, an employer, or a purchasing cooperative. Clinton's proposals
for reform required government-appointed Regional Health Alliances to
collectively oversee health coverage for over 80 percent of the population
under the age of 65.55 In the Netherlands, the Central Fund (a govern-
ment agency) is required to act as a sponsor. In the U.K., the Health
Authorities are responsible for monitoring Fundholders' activities, re-
sulting in a conflict of interest because theoretically Fundholders are in
competition with Health Authorities for patients' allegiance. Similarly,
in New Zealand, it is the Regional Health Authorities' responsibility to
administer managed care initiatives.
The apparent simplicity of the exit mechanism belies many of the
problems that have to be surmounted before it can be effectively
operationalized. These problems include the incentive for competing
purchasers to "cream skim" healthy enrollees and avoid enrollees with
high health costs or with a high risk of such costs in the future; the need
to solve the basis upon which price competition will occur; and the need
to define "core" services. This term refers to the range and quality of
services purchasers will compete to provide (or, put another way,the need
to define consumer entitlements). Other problems include the question of
whether consumers have or will have sufficient information to choose
wisely between competing purchasers, the problem of transactions costs,
and the problem of supply side monopoly.
1. Cream Skimming
When a consumer exits from one purchaser to another there is a risk that
she/he is moving as a result of cream skimming. This would be inefficient
as it would be rewarding purchasers who compete on the ability to avoid
risk as opposed to the ability to compete on price and quality. The
technical difficulties, importance, and need for effective resolution of this
problem are generally underestimated in managed competition proposals.
In an unregulated private health insurance market, high risk individu-
als may be either priced out of, or simply excluded, from the insurance
154. A. C. Enthoven, "The History and Principles of Managed Competition" (1993) 12
Health Aff. 24 at 29.
155. See the American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., S. 1757, 1st
Sess.,(1993).
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market. For example, Fuchs notes that in the U.S. the competitive
revolution in health care has caused Blue Cross and Blue Shield, who
have historically fulfilled a defacto social insurance function, to cease
community rating and engage in risk rating. 5 6 As a consequence, a
growing proportion of the population is left without health insurance.
Similarly in the Netherlands, prior to managed competition reform, there
was increasing concern that risk-rating by private insurers was making
insurance unaffordable for elderly and unhealthy people and that some
high-risk groups were being denied coverage altogether. 5
Managed competition reform proposals seek to satisfy equity concerns
by providing for mandatory universal coverage for a comprehensive
range of health services. Premiums are collected on an income-related
basis by a sponsor which is often a government agency. Citizens'
contributions do not depend upon their health cost and/or risk profile. The
sponsor pays on behalf of every individual a fixed annual premium to that
individual's chosen purchaser in return for which coverage is provided
for all of that individual's health care needs for a core range of services
(as defined by regulation) in that year. This is in effect a sophisticated
voucher scheme. However, if competing purchasers receive the same
premium for each insured individual then they have an incentive in a
managed competition model to cream skim those enrollees with low
health costs and avoid those enrollees with high health costs or a high risk
of incurring such costs in the future.'58
156. V. R. Fuchs, "Economics, Values, and Health Care Reform" (1996) 86 Am. Econ. Rev.
I at 20.
157. Factsheet, supra note 25 at 2.
158. For a discussion of cream skimming see J. P. Newhouse et al., "Adjusting Capitation
Rates Using Objective Health Measures and Prior Utilization" (Spring 1989) Health Care
Financing Rev. 41; F. T. Schut, "Workable Competition in Health Care: Prospects for the
Dutch Design" (1992) 35 Soc. Sci. Med. 1445; R. CJ.A. van Vliet & W. P.M.M. van de Ven,
"Towards a Capitation Formula for Competing Health Insurers. An Empirical Analysis"
(1992) 34: 9 Soc. Sci. Med. 1035; W. P.M.M. van de Ven & R. CJ.A. van Vliet, "How Can
We Prevent Cream Skimming in a Competitive Health Insurance Market? The Great Challenge
for the 90's" in P. Zweifel & H. E. Frech III, eds. Health Economics Worldwide (Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers,'1992) at 23; R.CJ.A. van Vliet, "Predictability of Individual
Health Care Expenditures." (1992) 59 J. Risk & Insurance 443. R.CJ.A. Van Vliet &
W.P.M.M. Van de Ven, "Capitation Payments Based on Prior Hospitalizations" (1993) 2
Health Econ. 177; W. P.M.M. van de Ven et al. "Risk-Adjusted Capitation: Recent Experi-
ences in the Netherlands" (1994) 13 Health Aff. 120; van de Ven, Schut & Rutten, supra note
15; J. P. Newhouse, "Patients at Risk: Health Reform and Risk Adjustment" (1994) 13 Health
Aff. 132; M. Giacomini, H.S. Luft & J.C. Robinson, "Risk Adjusting Community Rated Health
Plan Premiums: A Survey of Risk Assessment Literature and Policy Applications" [ 1995] Ann.
Rev. Public Health 401; and E. M. van Barneveld, R. C. J. A. van Vliet & W. P. M. M. van de
Ven, "Mandatory High-Risk Pooling: An Approach to Reducing Incentives for Cream
Skimming" (1996) 33 Inquiry 133.
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In order to minimize cream skimming, managed competition models
require purchasers to accept all who seek to enroll in their plan; however,
cream skimming behaviour may be more subtle. Tactics may include
contracting with certain types of providers in certain locations and not
with others (i.e., electing not to contract with the local facility specializ-
ing in oncology services) or locating the only benefits office on the top
floor of a building with no wheelchair access in an affluent white suburb.
Such tactics will usually (at least eventually) be detectable. Managed
competition models require sponsors to oversee and regulate purchaser
behaviour and require that citizens exercise their right to change purchas-
ers through the agency of their sponsor (i.e., the sponsor acts as an
individual's agent in effecting the switch). 59 This arrangement reduces
opportunities for the use of subtle cream skimming tactics. A sponsor
may also monitor movement by individuals between purchasers to insure
that such movement is not the result of cream skimming behaviour.
160
Another measure would be to license health purchasers on the condition
that they undertake not to engage in cream skimming behaviour with
penalties being enforced for violation of this condition. A related idea
would be for the government to define cream skimming tactics as per se
in breach in of competition law on the basis that allowing cream
skimming will result in the demise of firms better able to compete on price
and quality. All of the preceding suggestions for curbing cream skimming
are open to the criticism that purchasers will simply invent more sophis-
ticated and undetectable methods of cream skimming. Thus sponsors
must be continually monitoring competition and putting in place new
measures to reduce cream skimming incentives.
Aside from regulations and sanctions, a potentially less intrusive
means of reducing cream skimming is to correct the financial incentive
which encourages it. This requires the sponsor to risk-adjust the premi-
ums paid so that competing purchasers are compensated for the risk they
bear as a result of the risk profiles of the people that have chosen to enroll
in their particular plan. An adjustment in this regard must be effected in
any event to allow the continued viability of those purchasers with whom
a disproportionate share of enrollees with high health costs have enrolled.
Appropriately risk-adjusting premiums is essential to ensure fair compe-
tition. If this is not done then those purchasers that are adept at cream
skimming may receive greater income than competitors who perform
159. See for example Enthoven (1993), supra note 23 at 33.
160. J. E. Fielding & R. Rice, "Can Managed Competition Solve Problems of Market
Failure?" (1993) 12 Health Affairs 216 at 222 suggest "[olne thing that might help is for plans
to report the use and cost experience of disenrollees; this could be made public, alerting
consumers that certain plans have a tendency to 'dump' sick patients."
512 Dalhousie Law Journal
better on price and quality dimensions. The premiums must be adjusted
so that each purchaser receives a premium per enrollee that reflects their
perceptions of the particular individual enrollee's risk of utilization of
health services. It is purchasers' perceptions of risk which are important
as opposed to what the actual risk may be, for the latter is, given the
current state of knowledge, unascertainable.
In the Netherlands, managed competition reform requires the Central
Fund to collect income-related sums and from this to pay 85-90% of a
risk-adjusted premium on behalf of each and every individual to that
individual's chosen purchaser. The difficulty is that, to date, the Central
Fund has not appropriately risk-adjusted the premiums paid. In 1993 and
1994 premium payments were differentiated on the basis of age and
gender alone and did not include risk factors that could be readily
ascertained, such as an individual's chronic health status or medical
history.16 1 Van de Vliet and van de Ven found that if age and gender are
the only factors used for risk adjustment then there is a strong financial
incentive to cream skim. 62 They note that it is easy for purchasers to
identify those individuals with the greatest non-catastrophic health
expenditures in any year, and 10% of these individuals can be predicted
to have per capita expenditures four years later that are on average nearly
double theper capita expenditures within their age-gender group .163 The
inequity of inadequately risk-adjusted premiums has been acknowledged
in the Netherlands. In 1993 and 1994, the government required that
Sickness Funds be financially responsible for just 3% of the difference
between their actual expenditures on health services for their enrollees
and the total premiums received from the Central Fund."6 This percent-
age was subsequently increased to 14% in 1996 and 27% in 1997.165
Van de Ven and Schut contend that three misunderstandings lie at the
root of why the Netherlands has failed to date to implement a system of
adequately risk-adjusted payments.166 The first misunderstanding is the
161. van Barneveld, van Vliet & van de Ven, supra note 158.
162. van Vliet & van de Ven, "Towards a Capitation Formula For Competing Health
Insurers," supra note 158.
163. van de Ven et al., "Risk-Adjusted Capitation: Recent Experiences in the Netherlands,"
supra note 26 at 123.
164. W. P. M. M. van de Ven & F. T. Schut, "The Dutch Experience with Internal Markets"
in M. Jerome-Forget, J. White, & J. M. Wiener, eds., Health Care Reform through Internal
Markets: Experience and Proposals (Montreal: IRPP, 1995) 95 at 104. Sickness Funds are
non-profit organizations that have historically acted as monopoly insurers for the poorer 66%
of the Dutch population and thus may be assumed to provide for most high-risk patients.
165. Personal correspondence with Dr. Frederick Schut, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 24
March 1997.
166. van de Ven & Schut, supra note 164 at I 10-111.
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assumption that age, gender, and region will explain a large proportion of
the variance in health expenditures whereas, in reality, these factors only
explain 10-20% of the predictable variance in health expenditures for any
individual.'67 Similarly, in the U.S., it has been estimated that 5% of all
the aged entitled to the government's Medicare program account for over
50% of the total costs of the program and 36% of those covered do not
make any claims. 68 Thus, clearly, age is but one factor in ascertaining
who are high-risk individuals. Adjustments forage, sex, and location may
more satisfactorily explain variations between very large groups, but
risk-adjustment must occur at the individual level for the purposes of
managed competition reform as it is through the individual's decision to
exit that competing purchasers are held to account.
The second misunderstanding noted by Van de Ven and Schut has been
the assumption that the incentive to cream skim would be minimized
because of the ability to reinsure risks; however, reinsurance companies
will themselves generally charge risk-adjusted premiums to purchasers,
thus leaving in place the original incentive to cream skim.' 69 The third
misunderstanding is the assumption that if perfectly risk-adjusted premi-
ums were paid then purchasers would have no incentive to operate as
efficiently as possible. 7° Van de Ven and Schut believe that this argu-
ment is also flawed for two reasons. First, given the current knowledge
base, it is only possible to predict partially the risk of any individual's
future needs. The cream skimming incentive only arises where there is a
discrepancy between what risk factors are considered by purchasers and
what risk factors are incorporated into premiums paid by sponsors. If all
known risk factors were incorporated into premium payments then
purchasers would still have to manage the unpredictable risk of utiliza-
tion, the latter being much more significant than the former in determin-
ing future patterns of use. Van de Ven and Schut also argue that
adequately risk-adjusted premiums will not act as a disincentive for
efficiency as any savings are captured by purchasers (at least in the
private sector) as profit. This latter argument is more tenuous as, given
risk-adjusted premiums, private purchasers have an incentive to compete
to improve the quality of services provided so as to attract enrollees but
no incentive to compete on the level of premiums as the price is
effectively determined by the sponsor. This issue is discussed further
below under the problem of facilitating price competition.
167. Ibid. at 110.
168. S. S. Wallack et al., "A Plan For Rewarding Efficient HMOs" (1988) 7 Health Aff. 80
at 84.
169. van de Ven & Schut, supra note 164 at 110-111.
170. Ibid. at Il l.
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Another type of financial incentive that may deter cream skimming is
the use of "risk corridors" where the risk of high utilization is shared
between the sponsor and purchasers. This is currently the situation for the
U.K.'s G.P. Fundholders, who each bear financial liability only up to
£6000 per annum for any patient, and any costs incurred beyond this sum
are paid for by the Health Authority (i.e. the sponsor). 7 ' Such a measure
caps the risk incurred by a Fundholder, thus diminishing (but not
eliminating) the incentive to cream skim, but also removing any incentive
Fundholders have to be sensitive to the cost of the services they buy past
the figure of £6000. There does not appear to be any empirical evidence
(yet) that cream skimming is a serious problem in Fundholding practices;
however, the Audit Commission did find the inverse relationship be-
tween the proportion of Fundholding practices in an area and the average
degree of social deprivation to be highly significant statistically.'72 In
other words, through a process of self-selection, physicians are only
electing to become Fundholders in areas where on average their patients
are likely to be healthy. Even if cream skimming is not a problem in the
U.K. it is difficult to know whether this is attributable to the use of risk-
corridors, to the possibility that the ethical norms of physicians deter them
from cream skimming, or to the fact that, to date, there has been little real
competition between Fundholders.
Undoubtedly, cream skimming is a potentially serious problem. How-
ever, it must be remembered that such behaviour on the part of purchasers
sends a signal not only to those individuals whose risk has crystallized but
to other individuals that this particular purchaser is untrustworthy at the
time that it is needed the most. Thus, the need to maintain a good
reputation in the market place will inhibit cream skimming behaviour.
One can envisage that the need to maintain a good reputation will be more
salient for those health services and patients that mostpeople can identify
with. Thus, cutting the quality of health services for the elderly or for
patients with heart disease or cancer is likely to promote concern among
most people, who anticipate needing such services. Services for small
vulnerable populations or stigmatized health services (where people use
the "head in the sand" approach believing that their own risk, for example,
of psychiatric disease or of giving birth to a disabled child is much lower
than it really is) may be the services that are most at risk. Thus there will
be a need for the sponsor to emphasize in published data how well
purchasers treat the most vulnerable groups in order to foster a sense of
171. The National Health Service (Fund-Holding Practices) Regulation (U.K.), 1996, S.I.
1996/706, s.21.
172. What The Doctor Ordered, supra note 96 at 10.
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solidarity between the general populace and vulnerable groups within it.
In such a case, low-risk individuals may signal their dissatisfaction by the
use of either exit or voice with how a purchaser treats others who are not
similarly situated. There may, however, be a need for a sponsor to be
particularly vigilant with regard to the quality of services supplied to
small vulnerable groups with whom the rest of the populace has no
developed affinity.
Reform advocates must recognize that adequately dealing with the
issue of cream skimming is the key to managed competition reform and
absolutely necessary in terms of protecting vulnerable populations. The
role of sponsors is crucial in this regard. Will government-appointed
sponsors be up to the task and how will they be kept accountable? Will
they have the information needed to calculate risk-adjusted payments? In
the former command-and-control health systems of the U.K. and New
Zealand, which have historically produced little accessible data on
service usage, the initial costs of setting up information gathering systems
will be significantly higher and the transition more disruptive than in
countries like the Netherlands and the U.S. which have historically relied
to a greater degree on private insurers and private providers. Before
reform proceeds there should be a high level of confidence that the
transition will generate sufficient benefits to offset the cost.
2. Price Competition
If the sponsor determines the payment or premium to be received by
competing purchasers, then will there be any scope for price competition?
The Netherlands' reform proposal attempts to stimulate price competi-
tion by requiring that a fixed percentage of the premium (currently 10%)
be paid by each enrollee directly to his or her chosen purchaser.'73 The
purchaser may set this fixed annual fee at any level but it must be the same
fee for all enrollees (i.e. it cannot be risk rated). Enthoven's proposal for
managed competition reform requires that the premium paid by the
sponsor be pegged to the premium of the lowest priced purchaser, with
individuals having to bear the full cost of a decision to select a purchaser
with ahigher priced plan.174 By contrast, Clinton's managed competition
plan required that the sponsor's contribution be pegged to the average
price of all plans for fear that tying contributions to the lowest priced plan
173. In 1994 this averaged to approximately 200 guilders (U.S.$120) per person per annum:
van de Ven & Schut,supra note 164 at 102.
174. Enthoven, (1993), supra note 23 at 32.
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would result in lower-priced plans being "ghettoized," i.e., low quality
plans for poor people.
In order to foster price competition, it appears that one has to sacrifice
a total commitment to progressive financing of the system. The greater
the percentage of the premium directly paid by any individual to his or her
purchaser, the greater the incentive to compete on the basis of price but,
as a result, the financing of the health system becomes more regressive
as the poor will have to divert a greater percentage of their income than
the rich to paying a fixed fee. The purchaser will, in this case, have a
greater incentive to cream skim as this fixed payment will not be risk-
rated as it would be the same fee for all enrollees. Thus allowing a margin
for price competition brings with it the risk of increasing the potential for
cream skimming and adversely affecting distributive justice. Thus, the
margin allowed for price competition must be restricted to a relatively
small component of total costs. This problem has to be put in context.
There may be a concern that managed competition would result in a two-
tier system but this is not necessarily true or at least no more true then in
many systems (even those described as "single-payer" like Canada's)
that rely on private financing for important services such as general
practitioner services, drugs, and home-care services, or systems where
physicians consciously or unconsciously prefer patients and health needs
that they can most identify with (for example, treatment of heart disease
rather then prevention of diabetes). In other words, in every country there
is in reality a two-tier system although its presence is not always frankly
acknowledged. In seeking to facilitate price competition there is the
potential in managed competition regimes for the ghettoization of lower-
priced plans. This may lead one to conclude that there needs to be
regulatory control of premium prices to reduce the potential for wide
differences between the quality and coverage offered by the lowest and
highest priced plans. However, the spectre of an unacceptable two-tier
system is significantly lessened provided a comprehensive range of
health services is included in the publicly-funded basket and the sponsor
ensures that the quality of services in even the cheapest plan is at a level
acceptable to the majority of society.'75
175. So competition on quality dimensions would be those over and above sponsor-mandated
minimum requirements. For example, a sponsor may require that all elective surgery be
completed within 6 months but some health plans may offer to ensure provision of surgery
within 3 months.
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3. Defining Core Services and Entitlements
Defining what range and quality of health services will be made available
by competing purchasers and what citizens should be able to expect as
entitlements is important to managed competition reform. Ideally, citi-
zens should be free to move between purchasers in search of the best
premium price and/or quality of services knowing that an adequate range
and minimum quality will always be provided. 7 6 There have been
various attempts in the Netherlands, New Zealand, and in the state of
Oregon, U.S., to define the range of "core" services to be universally
available. Acknowledging that resources are limited, there have been
attempts to prioritize services in terms of importance, in order to assist in
allocation decisions. This task has proved to be quite elusive in practice.
The original Dekker proposals for reform in the Netherlands required
the legal definition of a standard package of benefits to be available to all
as part of the reformers' goals to improve access and solidarity (equity).'7 7
It was proposed that insurance contracts would be different forms of the
legally defined standard package and would vary only with respect to the
list of providers able to be visited and the conditions that must be fulfilled
in order for costs to be covered (such as a referral slip from a general
practitioner).' In 1991, the Dutch cabinet essentially skirted the hard
issues of what should and should not be included in the basic package by
deciding that 95% of current health services currently provided should be
included in the standard package. In 1992, the Dutch government's
"Committee on Choice in Health Care" produced a report (subsequently
known as the Dunning report) dealing with the rationing of services. 7 9
The Committee did not produce a prioritized list of services to be included
in the standard package but recommended that all services satisfy four
criteria before being included in the standard package. These criteria
were described using the metaphor of a funnel with four sieves with only
those services that managed to pass through the four sieves (or tests) to
be included. 8 ° The sieve approach provides guidance on what services
176. L.A. Berthgold, "Perspectives: Benefit Package" (1993 Supp.) 12 Health Aff. 99 at 100.
177. Factsheet, supra note 25 at 3.
178. van de Ven & Schut, supra note 164 at 101.
179. Government Committee On Choices in Health Care, Choice In Health Care (Rijswijk:
Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1992) (English version).
180. The Committee notes "[t]he first sieve retains care that is unnecessary, based on a
community-oriented approach. The second sieve selects on effectiveness, allowing only care
confirmed and documented as effective. The third sieve selects on efficiency, which can be
measured by such methods as cost-effectiveness analysis. The fourth sieve retains care that can
be left to individual responsibility. The Committee feels that any care that is retained in one of
the four sieves does not need to be in the basic benefit package;" ibid. at 19.
518 Dalhousie Law Journal
should be universally provided but applying these principles in practice
is an enormously difficult task requiring information on cost-effective-
ness and consideration of community values. After producing its report
the Dunning Committee was dissolved and no other institution
appears to have explicit responsibility for determining what services
should and should not be included in the basic package using the sieve
principles.
The Oregon Basic Health Services Act, passed in 1989, was designed
to extend coverage of the Medicaid package in Oregon to include all those
at or below the poverty line, primarily by means of explicitly rationing the
services provided.'81 In determining what priorities should be given to
different health services in the standard package, the Oregon Health
Service Commission solicited public input through consultation.'82 The
priorities accorded to services as a result of this process were the subject
of much criticism, particularly from health care providers, for ranking
low cost services such as correction of crooked teeth, thumb sucking,
lower back pain, toothaches, migraine headaches, and salmonella poison-
ing over possible life-saving treatments such as liver and bone marrow
transplants.'83 As a result of this criticism the Commission recompiled
the list of priorities using a methodology that largely eliminated cost
considerations and diluted the influence of public input. It re-ranked
services based on the treatment's perceived value to the individual
patient, its value to society, and the medical necessity of the treatment.
This reordering resulted in life-saving treatments being accorded a much
greater priority, which reflected physicians' concerns that the earlier list
violated the ethical "rule of rescue" that requires physicians to act in the
case of a life-threatening situation.
The Oregon experience highlights a number of important issues. If one
assumes that physicians were not acting solely out of self-interest in
advocating high-cost life-saving procedures but were driven predomi-
nantly by a moral imperative, then this suggests there must be rights to
181. The Oregon Basic Health Services Act, Or. Rev. Stat. §§414.705-414.750(1993). Prior
to implementation of this Act only those individuals who satisfied family status requirements
and had incomes equal to or less than 51% of the poverty line were eligible; Oregon Health
Services Commission, Prioritization Of Health Services: A Report To The Governor And
Legislature (1991) at xvii as cited by C. J. Halligan, "'Just What The Doctor Ordered':
Oregon's Medicaid Rationing Process and Public Participation In Risk Regulation" (1995) 83
Georgetown L. J. 2697.
182. For a fuller description of the processes see Halligan, ibid. at 2708-11.
183. See ibid. at2711-12.
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health services that should trump more utilitarian concerns.'84 Arguably
individuals should have certain basic rights such as a right to life and a
right to freedom from incapacity, pain, and suffering that should trump
more utilitarian cost-benefit considerations that might give greater soci-
etal priority to fixing crooked teeth. The great difficulty is that all such
rights must be limited to some degree (otherwise millions of dollars could
be spent on potentially life-saving treatments that have only a remote
chance of success). The conundrum is how to define these limited rights.
The Oregon process is interesting for the degree of community participa-
tion that it entailed, but one must question whether the results would have
been the same if the community had actually been determining the
priorities for health services for consumption by themselves as opposed
to those below the poverty line. This re-engages the earlier discussion of
voice and the argument that if the great majority of the population are
dependent on a system for the supply of health services, then there likely
will be the political will to ensure ready access to the supply of a
comprehensive range of services of high quality to everyone on the basis
of need as opposed to the ability to pay.
New Zealand's National Advisory Committee on Health And Disabil-
ity was initially constituted with the intention of defining a list of
prioritized core services to enable better comparison of competing
purchasers.'85 Notwithstanding that the proposal for managed competi-
tion between Regional Health Authorities and private purchasers has
been put to one side, the Committee has continued with its work. It is
contributing to the debate as to what are cost-effective services, what
sorts of general health services should be given priority, and what
services should be excluded from the publicly-funded sector. The Com-
mittee has found it impossible to develop a specific list of priorities in
treatment. 8 6 Significant discretion is thus left in the hands of the
Regional Health Authorities, who may find it easier to revert to the default
option of largely maintaining historical service patterns.
184. Support for this view comes from Sweden, where the notion of deploying resources to
help many people with mild disorders instead of a few with severe injuries and the notion of
giving priority to those patients who are considered to provide important contributions to
society, were both firmly rejected by a body constituted to consider priorities in health care -
Swedish Parliamentary Priorities Commission, Priorities In Health Care (Stockholm: Minis-
try of Health and Social Affairs, 1995).
185. NZ Health 1993 Act, supra note 19, s. 6.
186. Core Services For 1995/96: Third Report Of The National Advisory Committee On Core
Health And Disability Support Services (Wellington: The National Advisory Committee On
Core Health And Disability Support Services, 1994).
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In the U.K., there is no body equivalent to that which existed in the
Netherlands and Oregon and currently operates in New Zealand. Increas-
ingly there are calls in the U.K. to develop explicit rationing criteria.'87
If competition between Fundholders for patients is sufficiently devel-
oped there will be a greater need to define the range of publicly financed
services to provide a benchmark for performance.
The difficulties that have arisen should not deter continued attempts in
all jurisdictions at defining and prioritizing a core package of services to
be universally available. The complexity of rationing issues must be dealt
with by all types of health systems whether reformed along competition
lines or not, unless it is proposed, as has historically happened, to leave
these kinds of determinations to the value judgments of individual health
care providers. These issues must begin to be addressed by communities
as the growth of costly technology coupled with aging populations and
increasing expectations will stretch the ability of systems to meet de-
mands for health services. 88 Some may argue that determining core
services is a misguided endeavour that will stymie innovation and result
in inflexibility in the system ." From this perspective, the approach taken
in New Zealand where priorities are set in terms of general health needs
(i.e. Maori health, primary care etc.) may be a more fruitful one.
However, as all systems move towards managed care systems there
would seem to be a need to define specific entitlements and standards. It
is important that the process be an on-going one, with continual adjust-
ment being made at the margins to the services to be covered publicly.
Due to the value judgments involved in determining the relative priorities
for purchasing services, it is crucial that the public at large be consulted
and that the decision-maker in question be receptive to their opinions.' 90
187. See the (1996) 312 Br. Med. J. edition which is devoted to moving the debate forward
on the rationing of health care in the U.K.
188. Evans notes that it is not the ageing of the population per se that is problematic but the
rising rates of per capita utilization on the part of the elderly; R. G. Evans, "The Canadian
Health-Care Financing and Delivery System: Its Experience and Lessons for Other Nations"
(1992) 10 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 362 at 387.
189. See M. Rachlis, "Defining Basic Services and De-Insuring the Rest: The Wrong
Diagnosis and the Wrong Prescription" (1995) 152 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1401 at 1403. See also
R. Deber, "Beyond the Canada Health Act: the Public-Private Mix," paper presented for the
Ninth John Olin Annual Conference in Law and Economics, Canadian Law and Economics
Association, September 26, 1997.
190. The National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability is required to consult with
such members of the public, providers, and other persons as the committee considers
appropriate; NZ Health 1993 Act, supra note 19, s.6.
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4. Citizen Choice
One must consider the key question of whether citizens can make
effective choices between competing purchasers in a managed competi-
tion system. The argument is sometimes made by opponents of the
concept of managed competition that citizens are not capable of distin-
guishing between the merits of competing purchasers. Certainly it ap-
pears that in the present U.S. system, many Americans do not understand
the differences between health plans and may not be making effective
choices, although reportedly the vast majority (70%) are satisfied with
the choices they have made in the past.' 9' In any event, the U.S.
experience is not necessarily translatable to a managed competition
system, where a sponsor would be required to facilitate choice. There
would still be, of course, potential for purchasers to confuse citizens with
fine-print in their policies limiting and restricting access to and the quality
of services. As the action of individual exit is the primary means of
ensuring accountability in managed competition systems it is vital that
sponsors vigilantly monitor the policies offered by purchasers to consum-
ers.'92 There should be an insistence on plain language and a requirement
that any limitations on coverage be clearly spelt out on the front page of
the policy. Everyone should be entitled to expect, in the absence of
express limitations, that the coverage they have historically enjoyed will
be available to the same degree. Purchasers may offer to provide a greater
range of services in order to distinguish themselves from competitors, but
this may make comparison of purchasers difficult. 193 To help ameliorate
this problem sponsors could require that any additional benefits to the
basic package be listed on a separate page of the policy.
The issue of choosing an purchaser in a managed competition system
must be put in context. In internal market systems it is assumed that
government agents can be sufficiently astute and have the necessary
information to act as the purchasers of care. Surely it can also be assumed
that they are capable of disseminating this information to consumers?
Individuals make difficult decisions about when to visit their doctor,
191. See S. L. Issacs, "Consumers' Information Needs: Results Of A National Survey"
(1996) 15 Health Aff. 31 at 35.
192. E. W. Hoy, E. K. Wicks, & R. A. Forland, "A Guide to Facilitating Consumer Choice"
(1996) 15 Health Aft. 9 conclude that consumer choice of plans can be facilitated if sponsors
"(1) create a level field for comparison through standardized benefits and structured enrolment
processes; (2) offer a limited number of plans that meet appropriate selection criteria;
(3)provide comprehensive, objective and reliable consumer information; (4) support this
process with education; and (5) hold plans accountable through uniform reporting of perfor-
mance data."
193. Fielding & Rice, supra note 160 at 222.
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which doctor to visit, and which treatment option is preferable. In reality
these sorts of choices are arguably more vexed in terms of a lack of
information and making decisions at a difficult time, than choosing a
purchaser once a year.
There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that unacceptable restric-
tions of choice occur in the U.S. as a result of managed care.194 Again this
problem has to be put in context. The U.S. system has been described as
a "parody of excess and deprivation"'95 with historically well-insured
patients being able to access the system at any point, i.e., through
specialists, hospitals, etc. The concern expressed in the U.S. regarding the
diminution of choice might in fact be reflective of a gearing down of
expectations to accord more with other developed countries rather than
imposing any real threat to the quality of health care supplied. In any
event, a managed competition system does not in and of itself dictate the
degree of restriction placed on patients' choice of providers. Thus this is
a matter that could be regulated by sponsors if it were considered that
purchasers were unduly restricting patients' choice of providers.
Sponsors will also have to monitor and disseminate information to
citizens on the quality of various plans offered. This is a task fraught with
pitfalls as the quality of services offered is a difficult matter to measure
given that the relationship between the consumption of health services
and ultimate health outcomes is often ambiguous. Problems arise, for
example, in comparing the different mortality rates of hospitals, as high
mortality rates may not be a function of the quality of the service provided
but indicative of the characteristics of the patients admitted. Without
seeking to understate the burden that will be placed on sponsors in
managed competition reform, it is important to note that monitoring
quality will be a problem in all systems reformed along competition-
oriented lines. Thus, for example, New Zealand's monopsony Regional
Health Authorities must monitor the quality of competing health care
providers. Consequently, the difficulties associated with monitoring
quality cannot be used as a justification for not relying on competition as
a means of enhancing accountability if the alternative is internal market
reform where a government-appointed monopsony purchaser stimulates
competition between health providers. Consideration must be given to
providing for the needs for citizens who live with a physical or mental
194. See generally G. Anders, Health Against Wealth: HMOs and the Breakdown of Medical
Trust (Houghton Mifflin, 1997).
195. A. C. Enthoven & R. Kronick, "A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s:
Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy, I" (1989)
325 New Eng. J. Med. 854.
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disability or who are chronically or terminally ill. These citizens may be
particularly vulnerable to reductions in the quality of health services,'19 6
as it is particularly difficult to measure and monitor performance in terms
of providing services that are primarily of a caring rather than a curative
nature. This is a critical issue in any system that seeks to foster compe-
tition whether it be between purchasers (as in managed competition
models) or directly between providers (as in internal market models).
5. Transactions Costs and the Problem of Supply Side Monopoly
One must consider the transactions costs inherent in offering a choice of
competing purchasers. The greater the number of purchasers the greater
the choice for citizens and the greater the competitive vigour (provided
that sponsors are able to prevent cream skimming). However, a large
number of purchasers bring with it the prospect of higher transactions
costs and a diminution of purchasing power vis-ei-vis health care providers.
In order to be able to manage the risks associated with providing a
comprehensive range of health services, competing purchasers will find
it necessary to provide coverage for a relatively large population. Very
small groups carry a significantly greater percentage of utilization risk as,
generally, a relatively small number of individuals in any particular group
account for the lion's share of health expenditures.'97 Also, purchasers
will wish to be of a relatively large size to enhance their market power vis-
6-vis health providers. 198 For example, in response to the prospect of
competition between purchasers there has been an integration of sickness
funds and private insurers in the Netherlands. Between 1987 and 1991,
thirteen mergers took place involving 33 Sickness Funds, so that the
number of independent Sickness Funds was reduced from 46 to 26.199
Industry observers predict that as a result there will eventually be only 10
to 15 national chains of health insurers serving the Dutch population of
15 million.2 0 Thus, transactions costs in the Dutch reformed health
196. See the comments of M. Schlesinger & D. Mechanic, "Perspective, Challenges For
Managed Competition From Chronic Illness" (1993) 12 Health Aff. 123 at 130-131.
197. For example Wallack et al., supra note 168 at 84 note "[m]edicare claims data suggest
that for a random sample of 20,000 aged beneficiaries,the 95 percent confidence interval is plus
or minus about 4% ($100 in 1987) of the per capita cost for a year. Groups comprising only
one hundred enrollees would result in a 95 percent confidence interval of plus or minus 66
percent ($1300 in 1987)."
198. See OECD Health Policy Studies No. 2, supra note 25 at 99.
199. F. Schut, W. Greenberg, & W. P. M. M. van de Ven, "Antitrust Policy in the Dutch
Health Care System and the Relevance of EEC Competition Policy and U.S. Antitrust Practice"
(1991) 17 Health Policy 257 at 266.
200. As noted by van de Ven & Schut, supra note 164 at 97-98 and 105-106.
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allocation system may eventually be significantly reduced. The problem
may, in fact, prove to be the opposite one, with competition law having
to be invoked to ensure that there is real competition between large
purchasers in all regions and to prevent the maintenance or creation of
cartels.2° As purchasers transform into more aggressive buyers of health
services, creating a tension on the demand side never felt before, then the
response on the supply side may be to consolidate to create matching or
greater market power. Consequently, effective anti-trust legislation will
be required to maintain workable competition on the supply side.
As with the other problems of managed competition, the issue of
transaction costs must be put in perspective. These costs seem unlikely to
be greater in a managed competition system that requires competition
between purchasers for the supply of all publicly-financed services than,
for example, in the present internal market system in the U.K. which
allows 3500 GP Fundholders to act as smaller purchasers in addition to
the 100 Health Authorities. There are so many Fundholders because they
do not have to purchase the full range of publicly-funded health services
but only a very limited range of relatively low-cost services. In New
Zealand, in addition to the four Regional Health Authorities and one
Accident Compensation Corporation purchaser there are 61 Independent
Practice Associations, all acting as purchasers." 2 As managed care
flourishes in these internal markets (or for that matter in any system) the
effective number of purchasers increases and consequently transaction
costs will increase. Moreover, the present number of government-
appointed purchasers in the U.K. and New Zealand has been centrally
determined and there do not appear to be any particular economic or
planning reasons for the present number of purchasers in either jurisdic-
tion. Currently, both the U.K. and New Zealand have been reassessing the
number of government-appointed purchasers.2 3
Undoubtedly, the problem of monopoly supply is a serious one and an
increase in the number of purchasers in a market may exacerbate the
problem. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this issue in depth,
but there are mechanisms to deal with the problem of supply monopoly
201. See F. T. Schut, Competition in the Dutch Health Care Sector, (Ph.D. dissertation,
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 1995) at 224 [unpublished].
202. See "Report on Ministry of Health, Managed Care Conference, 2-4 May 1996, Managed
Care Applied" at http://www.enigma.co.nz/hcro/9607/9607/s07.htm.
203. In the U.K., a "NHS Confederation" came into being on 20 March 1997 which is meant
to be a representative voice for not only the 100 Health Authorities but also the 500 NHS Trusts;
see http://www.nahat.net/conact.htm. In New Zealand, the four Regional Health Authorities
are scheduled to be amalgamated into one national purchasing authority by 1 July 1997; see
T. Ashton, "Contracting the Kiwi Way: Costly or Constructive?" (Paper presented at the
CHEPA 10th Annual Health Policy Conference, Hamilton, Ontario, May 21-23, 1997).
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on the side. This would include regulation, anti-trust laws, the doctrine of
essential facilities, public ownership of monopolies, and joint bargaining
with monopolies on the part of purchasers. It is sufficient to note for
present purposes that the problem of monopoly supply will also be a
problem in internal market systems or any other form of system seeking
to encourage managed care where purchasing responsibility and finan-
cial risk is devolved to integrated groups of health service providers.
6. The Residual Role Of Voice
The preceding analysis shows that the role of the sponsor is crucial in
managed competition models. Sponsors are often government-appointed.
Where the sponsor is not government-appointed but is, as in the Clinton
plan, a large employer, the government still has to monitor and ensure that
the sponsor is performing its difficult, yet vital, regulatory role. The role
of government in managed competition systems, while different, is thus
no less crucial than in any other health allocation system that seeks to
ensure access to health services on the basis of need as opposed to ability
to pay.
There is also a need for voice or political accountability as a means of
enhancing accountability of competing purchasers in a managed system,
because patients may be trapped with a particular purchaser and its
affiliated provider until the next point in time when they can exit. This
may have serious implications if patients are demanding a service or
quality of service that their particular purchaser is resisting providing.
Time may clearly of the essence in these types of disputes, particularly
where the patient does not have the resources to pay for the services
personally while trying to obtain satisfaction from the purchaser. Thus,
charters of rights, access to a Health Services Commissioner or
Ombudsperson, and associated remedies remain relevant. 2°4 These ad-
ministrative processes are all means by which enrollees are able to
exercise their voice to protect the quality of services received.
Conclusion
Where government-appointed purchasers do not face competition, the
system relies on political accountability or voice to render purchasers
204. For example, E. D. Kinney,"Protecting Consumers and Providers under Health Retorm:
An Overview of the Major Administrative Law Issues" (1995) 5 Health Matrix 83 at 126 notes
that of all the proposals for health reform that abounded in the U.S. in 1993/1994, President
Clinton's proposal provided the most detailed framework for adjudicating disputes between
purchasers and enrollees.
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accountable. Significant and complex agency questions arise in this
respect. The theory of internal market reform requires purchasers to be
accountable to the citizens they ultimately represent in purchasing
services, but in practice this is given little weight in either New Zealand
or the U.K. A great deal of rhetoric emphasizes improving citizen choice
and enhancing public participation, but neither the regulatory framework
nor the allocation of resources reflects these goals. There is potential for
management contracts between government and purchasers to be de-
signed to reward efficient performance; the great difficulty is how to
measure performance and to resist focusing only on those performance
indicators that are the easiest to measure. The present lack of incentives
for managers of government-appointed purchasers seems to indicate a
lack of commitment in both the U.K. and New Zealand to the role of
government-appointed purchasers. However, the purchaser's role is
crucial to internal market theory, which hinges on astute bargaining
between government-appointed purchasers and competing public and
private providers.
This paper has canvassed a range of possibilities for strengthening the
use of voice on the part of citizens as a means to ensure the accountability
of both purchasers and government in internal market systems. Arguably,
mechanisms for voice could be sufficiently refined to ensure the account-
ability and efficiency of purchasers. As Longley notes, an institutional
framework is required to ensure that efforts in this regard are more than
mere tokens and that the public interest is properly taken into account .205
Possibilities include further devolution of purchasing power, mandatory
consultation, local elections of purchasers, and providing citizens with
more information regarding the level of service they can expect and
demand as a matter of course. Ultimately, I argue that for voice to operate
effectively it is crucial to ensure that those with political influence have
a vested interest in the performance of government-appointed purchas-
ers. The growth of private insurance covering some of the services that
are also supplied in the public sector reduces the incentives of the
politically influential to protect the quality of publicly-financed services.
The movement of dissatisfied individuals into the private insurance
market looks like "exit" but in reality it is not, for there are no financial
consequences for the government-appointed purchasers. As a result,
voice is diminished as an efficiency-enhancing tool and inequities are
increased.
Ensuring accountability through voice seems messy in comparison
with the primafacie simplicity of the exit or market mechanism. Man-
205. Longley, supra note 56 at 155.
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aged competition reform is essentially a sophisticated form of voucher
scheme. It is appealing in theory as it offers the spontaneous order of
competitive markets but with distribution inequities corrected. Individu-
als dissatisfied with their current purchaser may "exit" to another, taking
with them a risk-weighted share of public funding. However, "exit" is not
as appealing as it first appears because of the continued need for
significant government intervention to facilitate competition on price and
quality dimensions.
A managed competition system seems to have some advantages over
an internal market system for the following reasons:
a. there is no conflict of interest in government regulating and monitoring
purchasers as they are not government-appointed;
b. incentives do not need to be designed and included in management
contracts in an attempt to induce performance on the part of government-
appointed purchasers;
c. there are arguably clearer lines of accountability, with a direct line of
accountability between purchasers and their enrollees, and with sponsors
and purchasers having more clearly defined roles, the former being
largely a regulator and the latter left to enter into a variety of arrangements
with health providers;
d. individual preferences are given expression through the individual
action of exit whereas ensuring accountability only through voice satis-
fies the preferences of the majority or those with political clout;
e. managed competition reform provides scope for the use of both exit and
voice as efficiency-enhancing mechanisms on the part of citizens whereas
a pure internal market system relies solely on voice. Hirschman notes that
the use of voice as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism is diminished if
the public are not able to threaten, at the limit, to exit;
06
f. managed competition provides roles for the private sector and har-
nesses private sector creativity but not in the diminished way, as in New
Zealand and the U.K., in terms of creaming off the wealthy (and relatively
healthy) and supplying them with top-up insurance to cover the failings
of the public system (such as long waiting lists for elective surgery);
g. there is potential for greater innovation in contracting with purchasers
and the option of vertical integration with providers should this prove
more efficient. In other words, the exact forms of managed care arrange-
ments are not dictated centrally but are left to evolve in the face of
incentives to compete on price and quality dimensions.
206. Hirschman, supra note 81 at 82-83.
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The Achilles' heel of managed competition reform is whether or not
sponsors have the ability to deal adequately with the cream skimming
problem so as to encourage price and quality competition. Solving this
problem is crucial in order to protect vulnerable populations in managed
competition systems. It is important to note that cream skimming is not
solely a problem for managed competition systems, as increasingly
internal market systems and other systems (such as Canada) are encour-
aging managed care where integrated groups of providers carry the
financial risk of utilization by patients, thus resulting in an incentive for
health service providers to cream skim."°7 Similarly, the need to deter-
mine how to ration health services and to assess what services are cost-
effective is not solely a problem for managed competition systems,
although sponsors will have to monitor policies offered by competing
purchasers so that choice is facilitated.
The most significant advantage offered by an internal market system
with government-appointed monopsony purchasers over a managed
competition system is that of potentially lower transaction costs and
increased market power on the demand side. First it must be noted that
extra transaction costs are only a problem if they are not set off by
concomitant efficiency gains. It is of course difficult to calculate the
efficiency gains of a managed competition system as one has never been
fully implemented anywhere. It must also be recognized in the context of
comparing the managed competition model with an internal market
model that the problems of transaction costs and diminution in monop-
sony purchasing power will become an increasing problem in internal
markets as government-appointed purchasers increasingly contract with
small groups of providers offering managed care. In the U.K.'s internal
market, a limited form of competition between purchasers was encour-
aged (till the announcement of the most recent reforms in December
1997) from the bottom up by way of GP Fundholding. The transaction
costs of Fundholding are potentially higher than those associated with a
managed competition system. One must therefore question the wisdom
of the U.K.'s further expansion of the Fundholding initiative. One must
also question a reliance upon competing Fundholders as opposed to
competing purchasers on the ground that the ethical norms of Fundholders
as health service providers may be severely tested as they are put under
increasing financial pressure. In order to protect the role of physician as
that of patient advocate and to ensure the quality of health services
207. See M. Matsaganis & H. Glennerster, "The Threat Of 'Cream Skimming' in the Post-
Reform NHS" (1994) 12 J. Health Econ. 31.
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(particularly for vulnerable patients), it may be better to encourage
competition between large purchasers and regulate the degree to which
these entities can shift financial risk through capitation payment mecha-
nisms down to small groups of health providers.
A managed competition system offers the prospect of a mix of
regulatory, political (voice) and market (exit) mechanisms that can be
tailored to ensure the accountability of purchasers. Dranove argues in
favour of competition or exit for, "[a] regulated approach will lock in
existing institutional arrangements, with all future changes dictated by
the whims of the political process, rather than by the demands of
consumers."2 °8 But a politics-free health allocation system is an impos-
sible goal unless one is willing to sacrifice the goal of redistribution. In
managed competition models, government must manage or regulate
competition between purchasers to ensure universal coverage; eliminate
cream skimming; stimulate competition on price and quality; facilitate
choice by citizens and to ensure that the quality of services provided is
adequate.2 9 It is a serious mistake to assume that government's role is not
as critical where there are competing purchasers as it is where govern-
mental agencies act as the sole purchasers of services. Political account-
ability and voice continue to have a large and important role to play.
The Canadian approach to health reform has primarily been of the
macro cost containment school. This approach has been tried in many
countries over the course of the 1980s and has ultimately proved unsat-
isfactory from the perspective of truly controlling costs or reconfiguring
the system towards the supply of cost-effective services. The macro cost
containment approach may be thought of as akin to putting a lid on a
fiercely boiling pot (the health system). Pressure will periodically force
the lid up, allowing boiling water (costs) to overflow. Canada and all
health systems need more creative approaches. Although there are
undoubtedly problems and pitfalls with the managed competition model,
it certainly bears closer scrutiny from a Canadian perspective than its
dismissal as "powdered rhino hornm 10 or an "American style reform"
would indicate. The very strong resistance to any hint of Americanization
of the Canadian health system indicates that at least for the foreseeable
208. D. Dranove, "The Case For Competitive Reform In Health Care" in R. J. Arnould,
R.F. Rich & W .D. White,eds., Competitive Approaches to Health Care Reform, (Washington,
DC: Urban Institute Press, 1993) at 79.
209. For a comment on the problems inherent in Clinton's managed competition plan see
generally L. D. Brown & T. R. Marmor,"The Clinton Reform Plan's Administrative Structure:
The Reach and the Grasp" (1994) 19 J. Health Pol., Policy & Law 193.
210. Evans, supra note 2 at 462.
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future an explicit policy promoting managed competition reform is
unlikely to be implemented. Moreover, it is true that if a government's
goal in health reform is simple cost containment, as opposed to higher
productivity and lower production costs whilst satisfying social justice
goals, then a managed competition model may be unacceptable as it could
conceivably result in high overall expenditures due to higher responsive-
ness to citizen's preferences and needs. Accepting this, the question
arises as to what other measures could be taken to reform the present
Canadian system that would be more politically acceptable.
In most provinces there has been a shift to devolving budgets and
health allocation responsibility to regional government-appointed au-
thorities. Although this initiative is described as devolution there is also
a significant amount of centralization as these regional government
authorities assume management responsibilities for hospitals, a function
formerly performed by hospital boards. Thus, these new regional govern-
ment authorities are both purchasers and providers as they are responsible
for buying services and for managing hospitals. These new entities
resemble the Area Health Boards and District Health Boards that were in
existence in New Zealand and the U.K. prior to internal market reform.
In the U.K. and New Zealand this vertical integration was viewed as
problematic as there was no incentive for these regional entities to
contract out to other potentially more efficient providers or to shift
funding from acute and high technology care to primary and preventive
care. Should Canada consider a move to an internal market system similar
to that implemented in the U.K. and New Zealand? From the perspective
of policymakers in other countries, such as Canada, there is much to be
learnt from critically analyzing the experiences of the U.K. and New
Zealand systems.
On the positive side, benefits have clearly accrued in internal markets
from consolidating funding for a comprehensive range of health services
in regional purchasing authorities. Presently, public funding for hospital
and other secondary services is separate from physician services. There
is also a significant amount of private financing of drugs consumed
outside hospitals, medical equipment, and home care services." I Inte-
grating funding for secondary, primary and drug services in regional
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Papers (Ottawa: National Forum On Health, 1997).
Accountability of Health Service Purchasers
authorities would be a first step towards facilitating cost-effective substi-
tution between services.
The New Zealand and U.K. systems have experienced enormous
upheaval in implementing an internal market through a purchaser/
provider split only to see the split incrementally unravelled through
managed care arrangements and through developing close relationships
between government-appointed purchasers and providers. Recent an-
nouncements in both New Zealand and the U.K. propose the abandon-
ment of internal markets, although in both systems the change seems
likely to be more cosmetic than real as the purchaser/provider split, apart
from some name changes, is to be left in place. The clear lesson from the
U.K. and New Zealand is that enforcing a rigid purchaser/provider split
and mandatory contracting out is not the key or at least is insufficient on
its own. A rigid purchaser/provider split, like rigid vertical integration,
can be criticized as application of an inflexible and indiscriminate
solution to health service markets that are very different and dynamic.
What is key is that purchasing or budget-holding entities have the
resources, the skills and, in particular, the incentives to purchase and/or
provide the most cost-effective range of services and to be responsive to
the people in the region they represent. Thus the concerns of accountabil-
ity and governance are of primary importance.
In some provinces there has been discussion with regard to changing
the method of payment for physicians from fee-for-service to capitation
or a hybrid payment and experimenting with managed care. All methods
of reimbursement have their advantages and disadvantages. Once more
what is key is that a proactive purchaser has the incentives to select the
right payment mechanism in any particular health service market. Much
greater attention needs to be given to ensuring tension on the demand or
purchasing side or, in other words, ensuring good governance on the part
of these regional government authorities. It is this issue that demands
future research and consideration on the part of policymakers, lawyers,
and economists.
